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NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
I. INTRODUCTION
RICK CLIMAN: Good morning everyone, and welcome to our
(Moderator) presentation. Our topic today is negotiating
acquisitions of public companies, and with us
on the panel are:
* Gar Bason, an M&A partner at the law
firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell in
New York City;
* Fred Green, an M&A partner at the
law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges in
New York City; and
* Joel Greenberg, an M&A partner at the
law firm of Kaye Scholer in New York
City.
We are also joined by:
* Tom Johnson of the well-known
strategic communication advisory firm
of Abernathy MacGregor in New York
City;
* Rachel Posner, General Counsel of
Georgeson, a leading proxy solicitation
firm in New York City;
* Lisa Schmidt, a litigation partner at the
Delaware law firm of Richards, Layton
& Finger in Wilmington; and
* MJ Moltenbrey, an antitrust partner in
the Washington, D.C. office of the law
firm of Dewey & LeBoeuf.
My name is Rick Climan. I'm a partner in the
Mergers & Acquisitions Group at Dewey &
LeBoeuf in Silicon Valley, California, and I
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have the distinct privilege of chairing this
session.
As the title of this segment suggests, we're
going to be confining our discussions this
morning to acquisitions of publicly traded
companies. More specifically, we're going to
limit our focus to acquisitions of U.S.-based
Delaware corporations with shares listed on a
U.S. securities exchange. We will not be
addressing acquisitions of privately held
companies, which will be covered in a separate
panel this afternoon.10
With cash remaining the acquisition currency
of choice in today's M&A marketplace, we're
going to further limit our discussions this
morning to deals in which the acquisition
currency used to pay the purchase price
consists exclusively of cold, hard cash on the
barrelhead, as distinct from, say, shares of the
buyer's stock or some other form of non-cash
consideration.
A quick note on terminology: for ease and
consistency of reference throughout the
presentation this morning, we're going to be
using the term "target company," or simply
"target," to refer to the public company that is
being acquired by the buyer.
In this realm of cash acquisitions of U.S.-based
publicly traded companies, we're going to
emphasize a particular deal structure that has
become quite popular in today's M&A
marketplace, at least for strategic acquirers.
This is the so-called "two-step" acquisition
structure, comprising a first-step, friendly cash
tender offer made by the buyer for the
10. Byron Egan et al., Private Company Acquisitions: A Mock Negotiation, 116
PENN ST. L. REV. 743 (2012).
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outstanding shares of the target company,
followed by a second-step, back-end, clean-up
cash merger in which the price per share
payable to the target company's stockholders is
exactly the same as the price per share paid for
shares tendered in the first-step tender offer."
Please turn to the materials for our
presentation, as I think you're going to want to
follow along.12  They include a series of
excerpts both from the preliminary deal
documentation and from the definitive
acquisition agreement for a hypothetical two-
step cash acquisition of a publicly traded
Delaware corporation. You may want to turn
to the index to the materials to get a general
sense of what we're going to be covering this
morning.
Our format today, as advertised, is going to be
a modified mock negotiation. Fred Green will
generally play the role of outside counsel for
the buyer, which we're going to assume for
most purposes today is a strategic buyer and
not a private equity fund or so-called
"financial" buyer. Gar Bason will generally
play the role of the lawyer for the publicly
traded target company. I will act as the not-
necessarily-neutral moderator, referee, and
peacekeeper all rolled into one, reserving to
myself the right to take sides and flip-flop as I
see fit.
11. See infra Appendix P for an illustration of a two-step acquisition transaction.
For a discussion of acquisitions of public companies structured as one-step, stock-for-
stock mergers, see Richard E. Climan, Joel I. Greenberg, Lou R. Kling & Norman
Veasey, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 219
(2002). See also MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONs COMMITTEE, ABA SECTION OF BUSINESS
LAW, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC COMPANY (2011)
[hereinafter MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT].
12. The presentation materials can be found in the appendices to this article.
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I'm going to be asking both Fred and Gar to
step out of character frequently today to
illuminate their negotiating strategies, and I'll
also be soliciting comments from Joel
Greenberg, who will help us understand the
way these deals work. In addition, I'm going
to be requesting comments from the others on
the podium on issues that fall within their
respective spheres of expertise.
II. CHOICE OF STRUCTURE: ONE-STEP VS. Two-STEP
TRANSACTIONS
RICK CLIMAN: Before we get into the give and take of the
(Moderator) actual deal negotiation, let's take a moment to
examine some relevant threshold
considerations.
Fred, your client, the buyer, is seeking to buy a
public target company for cash. Why use this
two-step structure? It seems very complicated.
What's wrong with the straightforward, tried
and true single-step cash merger with which
almost everyone in this audience is very
familiar? That's the structure in which the
target company merges, either directly with the
buyer or-more typically-with a subsidiary of
the buyer, and in which each of the outstanding
shares of the target company's stock is
converted into the right to receive the per-share
purchase price in cash, all in a single step.13
This one-step structure gets you to the very
same place as the two-step structure, and it
would certainly seem to be a lot simpler.
FRED GREEN Rick, there's nothing wrong with a one-step
(Counsel for Buyer): deal and there are lots of transactions which
still get done using a one-step structure. In a
13. See infra Appendix 0 for an illustration of a one-step, reverse subsidiary cash
merger.
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one-step deal, you sign the merger agreement
and announce it, and then the target company
prepares a proxy statement and clears it with
the SEC, mails the proxy statement to its
stockholders and holds a meeting of its
stockholders to vote on the merger.
In a two-step structure, you again begin by
signing and announcing the acquisition
agreement, but the buyer promptly begins a
tender offer for the target company's shares.
The tender offer will lead, if it is successful, to
a back-end merger, perhaps without the need
for a vote of the target's stockholders at the end
of the process.14
The main advantage of a two-step structure in
an all-cash deal is the potential time savings
you can achieve in executing the transaction
compared to a one-step deal. As we will
discuss later in the presentation,15 the parties
hope to avoid the need for a meeting of the
target's stockholders after the front-end tender
offer. They want to get right to a short-form
back-end merger, and they can do this if
they've had a highly successful tender offer in
which the buyer has acquired at least 90% of
the target's outstanding shares.
But a two-step structure has another timing-
related advantage even where the tender offer
attracts a majority, but less than 90%, of the
target's outstanding shares and the parties have
to do the back-end merger as a long-form
merger. The advantage is that the buyer will
have cut off the interloper risk once the tender
offer is completed, and that alone can be a very
important benefit.
14. See infra Part V; see also infra Appendix P (providing an illustration of a two-
step acquisition transaction).
15. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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What, exactly, do you mean when you refer to
"interloper risk"?
From the buyer's standpoint, once you have
committed to go forward with the acquisition,
you don't want to lose. And you lose if an
interloper-and by that I mean a competing
bidder-shows up with a higher offer before
the buyer has acquired control of the target
company. So in the right circumstances, the
two-step structure can help the buyer protect
the transaction by shortening the period in
which an interloper can come in, even where
the buyer cannot close the back-end merger
transaction concurrently with the closing of the
tender offer.
You save time by utilizing a two-step structure
rather than a one-step structure because in a
two-step structure you can begin the tender
offer very soon after you sign the acquisition
agreement, and the tender offer has to stay
open for only 20 business days-about a
month.16 You can get a two-step deal done in
about a month, or a little longer given the time
it may take to prepare the tender offer materials
before you commence the tender offer.
That's absolutely right. If you have the time,
then you will begin preparing the tender offer
materials while you're negotiating the
acquisition agreement, and literally within a
day or two after the acquisition agreement is
signed, you file your tender offer materials
with the SEC17 and commence the tender offer.
16. See infra note 54.
17. The buyer is required to file a Schedule TO, which includes the buyer's Offer to
Purchase, with the SEC "as soon as practicable on the date of the commencement of the
tender offer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(1) (2011). In a negotiated transaction, the
parties will typically include the recommendation of the target company's board of
directors in the tender offer materials, which requires the target company to file a
Schedule 14D-9 with the SEC at the same time. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(b)(1) (2011).
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If the tender offer is received well in the
market, then 20 business days later the buyer
can close on the tender offer. And-if the
tender offer has been received extremely well,
so that the buyer ends up with 90% or more of
the target's outstanding shares, the buyer can
close the back-end merger immediately upon
the completion of the tender offer.18
And even if you get SEC comments on your
tender offer documents, those comments will
come while that 20-business-day clock is
running, right?
Right. You typically get SEC comments on
tender offer documents sooner than you do on
a preliminary proxy statement, where a month
or so is the typical turnaround time for the
SEC.19  If you receive comments well in
advance of the expiration of the tender offer,
you will not have to delay the expiration of the
tender offer, nor in most instances will you be
required to mail a supplement to your tender
offer materials to the target's stockholders.2 0
18. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
19. Given that a tender offer may be commenced as soon as a tender offer statement
is filed and disseminated, and that the offer need only remain open for a 20-business-day
period, the SEC will review and provide comments on the tender offer statement in an
expedited manner. See Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7760, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42055, Investment
Company Act Release No. 24107, 64 Fed. Reg. 61408 (Nov. 10, 1999), for a discussion
of the SEC's commitment to review tender offer documents in an expedited manner.
20. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price,
Investment Company Act Release No. 15199, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23421,
Securities Act Release No. 33-6653, 36 SEC Docket 96-01 (July-11, 1986) ("The
minimum period during which an offer must remain open following material changes in
the terms of the offer or information concerning the offer, other than a change in price or
percentage of securities sought, will depend on the facts and circumstances, including the
relative materiality of the terms or information. As a general rule, the [SEC] is of the
view that, to allow dissemination to shareholders "in a manner reasonably designed to
inform them of such change" (17 C.F.R. 240.14d-4(c)), the offer should remain open for
a minimum of five business days from the date that the material change is first published,
sent or given to security holders. If material changes are made with respect to
information that approaches the significance of price and share levels, a minimum period
of ten business days may be required to allow for adequate dissemination and investor
response. Moreover, the five business day period may not be sufficient where revised or
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In contrast, if you're doing a single-step deal
and you get SEC comments, the applicable
clock hasn't even begun to run. Fred, what is
the "clock" that applies in a single-step deal?
And when does that "clock" actually start
running? Please walk us through the timing
considerations.
In a one-step deal, if you have adequate time,
you can begin to prepare your proxy statement
before the merger agreement is signed and
announced. You might have a separate team of
lawyers working on the proxy statement while
you're negotiating the merger agreement.
When you have that luxury, you should be able
to file a preliminary proxy statement within a
week or so after the merger agreement is
signed. More typically, however, even though
you may have started work on the proxy
statement before the merger agreement is
signed, much work remains to be done after the
merger agreement is signed. And, of course,
input from both parties is needed, as is input
from the target's investment banker.
So normally the target will not be ready to file
its proxy statement until about two or three
weeks after the merger agreement is signed.
Roughly 30 days after filing the proxy
statement, you would expect to receive SEC
comments. Of course, it always is possible that
the SEC staff will choose not to review the
proxy statement, which you should know by
the end of the 10-day waiting period.2 1 If the
additional materials are required because disclosure disseminated to security holders is
found to be materially deficient. Similarly, a particular form of dissemination may be
required. For example, amended disclosure material designed to correct materially
deficient material previously delivered to security holders would have to be delivered
rather than disseminated by publication.").
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2011) (requiring five copies of the proxy statement
and form of proxy to "be filed with the [SEC] at least 10 calendar days prior to the date
definitive copies of such material are first sent or given to security holders. . . .").
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proxy statement is reviewed by the SEC, and
assuming the parties know what they're doing
and there aren't any special wrinkles, you
should be able to resolve the SEC comments in
a week to ten days, and then mail the final
proxy statement to the target's stockholders.
So you're already out close to 60 days after the
announcement of the deal when you're first
ready to mail the proxy statement. Compare
that to a two-step deal where the parties could
conceivably already have closed on the tender
offer by that time. And in a one-step deal, the
"clock" doesn't even start ticking until you've
mailed the proxy statement to stockholders.
Once you've mailed out the proxy statement,
you have a minimum of another 20 days2 2 to
solicit proxies. Then the target would have its
stockholder meeting and the merger would
close on the day of the meeting. So, assuming
SEC review, call it a period of three to four
months from announcement to closing in a
typical one-step transaction, with the buyer
22. In a one-step merger transaction, after the proxy statement is cleared by the SEC,
the target company sets a shareholder meeting date that complies with the laws of its state
of incorporation as well as the requirements of its organizational documents. For
example, Section 251(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law requires that
shareholders receive notice at least 20 calendar days prior to the stockholder meeting at
which the merger is to be voted upon. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2012).
Under the federal securities laws, if a buyer is registering securities that are to be issued
as part of the merger consideration on Form S-4 (which would serve as both a proxy
statement and a prospectus) and is incorporating into the Form S-4 certain information by
reference, the SEC requires that the prospectus/proxy statement be distributed to
shareholders at least 20 business days prior to the shareholder meeting date. See General
Instructions, Note A to Form S-4.
The time it actually takes to solicit a sufficient number of proxies to ensure
obtaining the requisite stockholder vote in the context of a one-step merger transaction
varies. The needed time is determined primarily by (1) how many shares the buyer
already owns, (2) how closely the remaining shares are held and the breakdown between
institutional and retail shareholders, and (3) what percentage of the target's outstanding
shares is required to approve the merger under the law of the target's state of
incorporation and under the target's charter documents.
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subject to interloper risk up until the time of
the stockholder vote. 23
So you're potentially looking at a three- to
four-month process for a one-step transaction
versus five to six weeks for a two-step
transaction. There's obviously a timing
advantage from the buyer's standpoint in using
a two-step structure rather than a one-step
structure.
Gar, as counsel for the target company, would
you typically object to a two-step structure?
Might you actually prefer a lengthier period
between signing and closing to maximize the
chance that a higher bid might emerge?
Normally not. Fred and I have our own
mantras. One of my mantras as target's
counsel is, "Time is not on our side." And
that's because while Fred is worried about an
interloper coming in, I'm worried about two
other things. First, I'm worried about getting
money to the target's stockholders as quickly
as possible. Second, I'm worried even more
about deal risk.
We live in risky times with market problems
and any manner of other problems that might
affect the buyer's ability to close and that
might affect my client's business and the
continued accuracy of its representations and
warranties in the acquisition agreement. Any
day that the transaction has not yet closed is a
day when my business can suffer a problem
which-even though it's inconceivable to me
that Fred's client would ever change its mind
23. The period it takes to complete a one-step merger transaction may be shortened
significantly (e.g., by 30 days or more) if the SEC declines to review and comment upon
the target company's proxy statement. Typically, the SEC advises the target company
within 10 days after the filing date as to whether it will be reviewing and commenting
upon the proxy statement. See supra note 21.
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about doing the deal-could give Fred's client,
the buyer, the right to walk away. So I'm
interested in getting to the closing quickly, and
20 business days nowadays is plenty of time
for the investment banking community to find
other potential suitors for the target. As
Chancellor Strine has said, the banking
industry is not shy and retiring.24 A month is
plenty of time.
RICK CLIMAN: So, bottom line, our parties are in violent
(Moderator) agreement, perhaps for the only time today:
two steps are generally better than one. But
let's talk about the circumstances in which the
parties might actually prefer a one-step deal
over a two-step deal.
Fred, as deal lawyers we used to complain
about SEC Rule 14d-10, 2 5 the so-called "best-
price" rule, and its potential application in the
friendly tender offer context. What was the
problem and how did the SEC fix it?
FRED GREEN: Rule 14d-10 under the '34 Act is known as the
(Counsel for Buyer) "all-holders, best-price" rule. That rule
provides that all stockholders who are
24. See, e.g., In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006-07 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (noting disagreement with the characterization by plaintiffs that the M&A
market is "comprised of buyers of exceedingly modest and retiring personality, too
genteel to make even the politest of uninvited overtures"). Rather than shy suitors
waiting to be asked to dance, "[t]hey are not like some of us were in high school. They
have no problem with rejection. . . . [S]trategic buyers have not felt shy about 'jumping'
friendly deals crafted between their industry rivals." Id. at 1008. Indeed, "capitalists are
not typically timid, and any buyer who seriously [wants to buy a company could send] a
bear hug letter at any time, if it wanted to be genteel about expressing an interest." Id. at
1009.
Of course, there may be situations, such as if the company was not shopped at all
pre-signing, where the board needs some room for a post-signing market check. Even
then, a month from announcement to closing of the tender offer could be more than
enough time depending on the circumstances. But where the company was adequately
shopped over an extended period, "the decision to time limit the final auction process
cannot be deemed unreasonable given the length of the process .. . and the risk of losing
one of the finalists." Id. at 1009.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2006).
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tendering shares have to be paid the same per-
share consideration.26 The purpose of the rule
is to prevent unfair treatment and coercive
tender offers-like the old "early bird special,"
where those who tendered quickly would
receive a higher price for their shares.27
Ten or 15 years ago, a split arose in the
interpretation of Rule 14d-10 by the federal
courts, with some courts interpreting the rule
more broadly to encompass payments and
other benefits received by tendering
stockholders outside the tender offer,
including, for example, in their capacities as
employees of the target. These courts took the
position that Rule 14d-10 was implicated
because stockholders who were also employees
were being treated differently from non-
employee stockholders.28 That set off all sorts
26. Id. ("(a) No Bidder shall make a tender offer unless: (1) The tender offer is open
to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer; and (2) The
consideration paid to any security holder for securities tendered in the tender offer is the
highest consideration paid to any other security holder for securities tendered in the
tender offer.").
27. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price, Investment
Company Act Release No. 15199, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23421, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6653, 36 SEC Docket 96-01 (July 11, 1986) ("Without the all-holders
and best-price requirements, the investor protection purposes of the Williams Act would
not be fully achieved because tender offers could be extended to some security holders
but not to others. Such discriminatory tender offers could result in the abuses inherent in
'Saturday Night Specials,' 'First-Come First Served' offers and unconventional tender
offers since security holders who are excluded from the offer may be pressured to sell to
those in the included class in order to participate, at all, in the premium offered."). Id.
28. See, e.g., Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 303 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2002)
("Gerber alleged that, in acquiring On-Line, CA paid more money per share to Jack
Berdy, On-Line's chairman and chief executive officer, than it paid to other On-Line
shareholders, in violation of various provisions of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i),
78m(d)-(e), and 78n(d)-(f), and regulations promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-10."); Mark Khmelnitskiy, Note, Structuring Transactions Outside All
Holders/Best Price Rule, 9 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 501, 502-503 (2004) ("While the
provisions of Rule 14d-10 addressed the original purpose of protecting security holders
from coercive tender offers, within the past decade, Rule 14d-10 has been invoked as a
sword to invalidate agreements made in conjunction with tender offers, or make the
agreements a part of the tender offers. These agreements, although frequently conferring
various benefits upon key employees and management, who are usually large security
holders, nevertheless do not constitute a greater consideration for the tendered securities.
The courts, however, have entertained allegations that such agreements violate Rule 14d-
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of alarm bells, and what we essentially saw
was a significant fall-off in the use of two-step
transactions.29
The SEC finally addressed this issue in 2006
by amending Rule 14d-10.30 The amendments
clarified that Rule 14d-10 is not intended to
apply to compensatory arrangements. Rather,
it is intended to apply more narrowly to the
actual consideration paid for shares tendered in
the tender offer.
It took a while for the market to digest the new
rule and for two-step transactions to catch back
on, but within a couple of years they came
back into fashion, and, as you'll hear, they are
now widely used."
RICK CLIMAN: The Rule 14d-10 amendments were a
(Moderator) wonderful example of the SEC actually
listening to the practical concerns of deal
practitioners.
Joel, suppose the buyer here, instead of being a
strategic buyer as we posited, were a private
equity buyer, a financial buyer. Could that
affect the buyer's preference for a two-step
structure over a one-step merger structure?
10 and created controversy in interpreting payments and promises made near, or in
relation to, tender offers.") (citations omitted).
29. Of the 212 transactions surveyed by the Negotiated Acquisitions Committee
(now known as the Mergers & Acquisitions Committee) of the Section of Business Law
of the American Bar Association ("ABA M&A Committee") for its "2007 Strategic
Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study" covering M&A
transaction announced in 2005 and 2006, only 15 (7%) were structured as tender offers.
ABA M&A COMMITrEE, 2007 Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions
Deal Points Study, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfn?com=
CL560003.
30. Amendments to the All Holders Best-Price Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
34,54684, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2536, 1 (2006) ("These amendments are intended to make it
clear that the best-price rule was not intended to capture employment compensation,
severance or other employee benefit arrangements.").
31. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Commentator)
It definitely would, because a private equity
firm or other financial buyer will generally be
using debt financing to fund a significant
portion of the purchase price. A two-step deal
presents the very real possibility that, if the
buyer is unable to reach the 90% ownership
threshold that would enable it to do the back-
end merger as a short-form merger, it could be
required to take down and pay for somewhere
between 50% and 90% of the target's
outstanding shares at the closing of the tender
offer. Then, given the need to go through the
SEC proxy or information statement process
for the second step, it could be another two
months or more before the buyer could effect a
long-form merger and acquire the remainder of
the outstanding shares. 32
That interim period is very uncomfortable for
financing sources, because the only available
collateral is a majority stock position in a target
that still has a public stub; the direct security in
the target's assets that lenders prefer is not
available until the buyer acquires 100%
ownership of the target through the second-step
merger. The lenders also have to be concerned
about the margin rules in this scenario.
While it's not impossible to finance a deal on
this basis, it is certainly more challenging and
costly.
32. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
33. Acting under Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g
(2006), which requires the adoption of "rules and regulations with respect to the amount
of credit that may be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any
security. . ."), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has adopted the
margin rules: Regulation T ("Credit by Brokers and Dealers"), 12 C.F.R. Part 220;
Regulation U ("Credit by Banks and Persons Other Than Brokers or Dealers for the
Purpose of Purchasing or Carrying Margin Stock"), 12 C.F.R. Part 221; and Regulation X
("Borrowers of Securities Credit"), 12 C.F.R. Part 224. The general effect of these
requirements is to limit the amount of secured (or indirectly secured) debt financing for
the purchase of such a majority stock position to 50% of its value.
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Of course, a buyer could set a 90% minimum
condition for its tender offer, which would
eliminate the problem because with 90%
ownership it could do a short-form merger and
eliminate the time gap between the completion
of the front end and the back end. But a buyer
really wouldn't want to do that because it could
have a very successful bid and still not meet
the 90% condition, and then there's no deal.
And of course it's not just the buyer that
wouldn't want the 90% minimum condition . . .
That's right. As target counsel, I get a vote
here too, and I would be getting red in the face
pointing out that in a sample size of thousands
of U.S. acquisitions, there were maybe two that
had 90% minimum tender conditions.34
You certainly could see a scenario where the
buyer would be fine having a 90% minimum
tender condition because it adds optionality
and addresses the financing condition that Joel
described. The buyer can always waive the
condition and close with fewer shares tendered
as long as there are tenders for a majority of
the outstanding shares. But a 90% condition is
never used in practice. The target would never
agree to that high a minimum condition.
Both parties share that same concern. We have
seen a couple of examples of a hybrid structure
which was pioneered in the Burger King
transaction, where the bidder went out
concurrently with a tender offer and a merger
proxy statement and, if it couldn't reach the
90% short-form ownership threshold in the
tender offer, it could immediately switch to the
one-step mode and conclude the transaction
34. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
35. See Burger King Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 3, 2010).
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that way. That's expensive, because you're
doing two transactions at once, and I think it's
only been followed once that I'm aware of.
The SEC Staff has weighed in on that, and has
expressed concern at the concept of having a
proxy statement out there when the tender offer
is "live." The worry is that the proxy statement
could be considered an offer for a potential
acquisition outside the tender offer, which is
prohibited by Rule 14e-5. So you have to
terminate the tender offer or wait until after it
has expired before a proxy statement can be
filed.
So Joel, putting aside the Burger King situation
and the Gymboree situation,37 which is the
other situation where this hybrid structure was
used, is it fair to say that deals in which private
equity buyers, or for that matter strategic
buyers, need debt financing are still almost
always done as one-step mergers?
That's right. The burden of financing that first
step is too great. There have been a few
transactions, particularly in the middle market,
in which a private equity firm provided its own
bridge financing for a tender offer,3 8 but that's
rare.
Particularly now where virtually every deal
that's out there is getting flexed to the max and
36. Rule 14e-5 prohibits purchases of any subject securities except as part of the
tender offer, from the time of public announcement of the tender offer until the tender
offer expires. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-5 (2011). The Chief of the Office of Mergers and
Acquisitions of the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC has stated that the Staff
views the filing of a preliminary or definitive proxy statement for a second-step merger
while the first-step tender offer is pending as a violation of Rule 14e-5. See Securities
Regulations and Compliance Alert (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Wash.,
D.C.), Dec. 20, 2011, at 1.
37. See Gymboree Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 12, 2010).
38. See, e.g., Onex Rescare Acquisition, LLC, Tender Offer Statement (Schedule
TO) (Oct. 7, 2010) (in respect to the acquisition of Res-Care, Inc.).
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Rachel, let me turn to you, because you work at
a firm that solicits proxies in one-step deals
and that also gets involved in helping buyers
solicit tenders in two-step deals. Might the
parties prefer a two-step tender offer deal over
a one-step merger on the theory that it's
somehow easier for a buyer to solicit tenders
than it is for a target company to solicit
proxies?
Yes. We all would think it's probably easier to
solicit tenders than it is to solicit votes. That
being said, we have seen situations where
index funds have to abide by a firm mandate
not to tender, and that can actually hold up a
two-step deal. Index funds generally prefer to
get squeezed out in the back-end merger. 39 So
where a large number of target shares are held
by index funds, it may actually be preferable to
structure the acquisition as a one-step merger
rather than as a tender offer.
Rachel, let me ask you another question. ISS4 0
scrutiny is a hot issue now in many large and
even not-so-large M&A transactions, and it's
certainly of great concern to some of your
firm's clients. Does structuring a deal as a
tender offer rather than a one-step merger
39. See, e.g., David Fox, Daniel E. Wolf & Susan J. Zachman, Some Tender Offer
Quirks, Kirkland & Ellis LLP Client Memorandum (Oct. 9, 2009) (describing generally
understood index fund policies and practices). For example, index funds typically will
not tender into an offer where the market price is above the offer price. "Moreover, many
will not tender into an offer at all, regardless of the relationship of the market price to the
offer price, so long as the stock is still included in the relevant index the fund is mirroring
or tracking." Id.
40. "ISS is the leading provider of corporate governance solutions to the global
financial community. More than 1,700 clients rely on ISS' expertise to help them make
more informed investment decisions on behalf of the owners of companies. ISS' services
include objective governance research and analysis, end-to-end proxy voting and
distribution solutions, turnkey securities class-action claims management, and reliable
governance data and modeling tools." About ISS, ISS AN MSCI BRAND,
http://www.issgovemance.com/about (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
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actually avoid ISS scrutiny?
RACHEL POSNER: Once upon a time people would prefer to
(Information Agent) structure a deal as a tender offer to avoid ISS
scrutiny. But today, ISS scrutiny reaches far
and wide and structuring your deal as a tender
offer does not always avoid ISS scrutiny.4 '
RICK CLIMAN: Joel, are there any other reasons why a buyer
(Moderator) might not prefer a two-step structure in an all
cash acquisition?
JOEL GREENBERG: Yes, Rick. Regulatory reasons, such as a
(Commentator) perceived antitrust issue that might lead to a
"second request" 42 or a regulatory approval
41. According to ISS, its "US research team generally provides proxy analyses and
voting recommendations for common shareholder meetings of publicly-traded U.S.
companies that are held in [its] institutional investor clients' portfolios." ISS,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON US POLICY INTERPRETATION AND RESEARCH,
http://www.issgovemance.com/policy/USResearchFAQ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
While ISS's policies do not require ISS to provide recommendations with respect to
acquisition transactions-such as friendly tender offers-that do not initially entail a
meeting of stockholders, in practice ISS does provide recommendations with respect to
certain such transactions. See, e.g., Press Release, Agrium urges CF stockholders to
tender shares into Agrium offer of $40.00 in cash plus one Agrium share per CF share,
which expires June 22 (June 16, 2009), available at http://www.agrium.com/news/
05784_9328.jsp ("ISS ... the leading independent proxy voting and corporate
governance advisory firm, has recommended that stockholders of CF Industries Holdings,
Inc . .. tender their shares into Agrium's exchange offer of $40.00 in cash plus one
Agrium share per CF share."); see also Interview: Chris Young of ISS/RiskMetrics, THE
PRoxY FILES (Morrow & Co, LLC, Stamford, Conn.) April 2010, at 7, available at
http://www.morrowco.com/knowledge-base/PDF/theProxyFilesAPRIO.pdf (explaining
that ISS does not "promise systematic 100% coverage of tender offers as . . . for merger
proxies," but generally covers tender offers that are contentious and where a
recommendation may make a difference in the outcome).
42. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)
(the "HSR Act"), requires parties to provide notice of mergers and acquisitions that meet
certain size thresholds to the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice.
An HSR Act filing triggers an initial 30-day waiting period during which the transaction
cannot be consummated, although transactions that do not raise substantive antitrust
concems routinely receive early termination of the waiting period. Id at § 18(b)(1). If a
transaction raises antitrust issues, the regulators can issue a "second request" for
information, which extends the waiting period during which the transaction cannot close
until 30 days after the parties have substantially complied with the second request, a
process that can take several months. Id. at § 18(e). In the case of an all-cash tender
offer (including a "friendly," negotiated cash tender offer of the type discussed in this
article), the HSR Act waiting period is only 15 days, or 10 days after substantial
compliance with any second request. Id. at § 18(b)(1).
634 [Vol. 116:3
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
that's going to take time, in an insurance
company or bank acquisition, for example. In
these cases, the speed advantage of the two-
step structure is actually a disadvantage. The
buyer can't take down the shares in the first-
step tender offer without clearing the
regulatory hurdles, because it is generally the
buyer's acquisition of shares over a specified
threshold that is prohibited without regulatory
approval.
But you can take a vote of stockholders before
obtaining regulatory approval, because the vote
by itself doesn't give the buyer control of the
target company. It just locks the deal in with
stockholder approval, eliminating the interloper
risk while you're waiting for the needed
regulatory clearance. So if you expect a three-
or four-month regulatory process, you're not
going to want to make a tender offer and then
have to keep extending it, because throughout
the time you're extending the tender offer, the
deal is vulnerable to interlopers. But if you use
the one-step structure, you can hold the
stockholder meeting, get the vote out of the
way and eliminate the interloper risk early in
the process.
There's another situation I can think of in
which a one-step merger may be preferable to a
two-step structure involving a tender offer.
There are some companies with high-low vote
structures, with a control block of high-vote
shares that could deliver the required vote in a
merger transaction, but can't meet the
minimum condition in a tender offer because
the high vote shares generally convert to low-
vote shares upon, among other things, being
tendered in a tender offer.43
43. See, e.g., Emergency Med. Servs. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr.
22, 2011) (in respect to acquisition by affiliates of Clayton, Dubeilier & Rice Fund, L.P.).
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RICK CLIMAN: Joel, let's tie this all together. If I asked you to
(Moderator) run some statistics on the prevalence of two-
step deals versus one-step deals in situations
where the deal doesn't require debt financing,
and where the deal is not antitrust sensitive and
does not involve a regulated industry, about
what percentage of that universe of deals do
you think would be done as two-step deals
rather than one-step mergers?
JOEL GREENBERG: It's hard to be precise, because from the
(Commentator) outside you can't always tell whether the
parties perceived a meaningful antitrust risk or
not, but I think it's fair to say a significant
majority of the deals that don't present one of
these negative factors are now done as two-step
deals."
RICK CLIMAN: So for that category of transactions, the two-
(Moderator) step deal is not only favorable in theory, but in




Let's turn now to the specific documents that
the parties will be negotiating, and let's get into
some of the back and forth that goes on in the
negotiations. We'll begin by spending some
time on the preliminary documents-the
documents that precede the execution of the
definitive acquisition agreement.
44. Of the 126 transactions surveyed by the ABA M&A Committee for its "2011
Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study" covering
M&A transactions announced in 2010 (the "2011 ABA Study"), 39 (31%) were
structured as tender offers, an increase from 7% of the transactions surveyed four years
earlier. ABA MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS SuBCoMMIrEE ON M&A TRENDS, 2011 ABA
Strategic Buyer/Public Target M&A Acquisitions Deal Point Study, available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL560003. The 126 transactions
surveyed for purposes of the 2011 ABA Study undoubtedly include some antitrust-
sensitive transactions and some transactions that required debt financing. The relevant
percentage would presumably be higher than 31% if these categories of transactions were
excluded from the survey sample.
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One particularly important preliminary
document, and often the very first document
signed by the parties in their transaction, is the
confidentiality agreement, the first draft of
which is usually prepared by the target
company's counsel.
Despite its straightforward title, this is a
document that often incorporates important
substantive provisions beyond the prospective
buyer's basic non-disclosure covenant. These
additional substantive provisions may include,
for example, a non-solicitation provision-a
provision prohibiting the prospective buyer
from soliciting the target company's employees
for some period of time. But for our purposes,
the most important of these additional
provisions is the so-called "standstill"
provision, which is illustrated [in Appendix A].
Gar, what is a standstill and what kinds of
restrictions does it incorporate? And what's
the target company's rationale for proposing a
standstill provision?
A standstill provision basically says to the
buyer, "You will not try to buy this target on an
unsolicited basis; you won't buy its securities
in the open market; you won't make offers to
buy the target."
You won't go hostile.
You won't go hostile. And, the rationale is
this: it's extraordinarily buyer-friendly to
provide your material nonpublic information to
a potential buyer, and as a target you would
never do that without making sure you
basically control your fate, subject to some
escape hatches that the buyer may fairly ask
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for.
Think of two hypotheticals that will help
illustrate why this is important. The first
hypothetical involves a target thinking about a
possible transaction with one prospective buyer
in particular. The target is not interested in a
broad sale process, but it is interested in
discussing a possible deal with one particular
prospective buyer-a potential deal it views as
highly strategic, and I understand that's a
loaded word. The notion is the target will have
some discussions with this particular
prospective buyer, and will see if there is a deal
to be had here. If not, each party will go
home-no harm, no foul-and return to
business as usual.
From the target's perspective, the nightmare
scenario is that it has shown its confidential
information to this would-be buyer, and the
would-be buyer says, "I'll pay $30 per share to
buy your company." The target in good faith
says, "No, that number is way too low for us.
Let's just go our separate ways." And then a
week later the would-be buyer announces a
hostile bid at $30 per share. That is a
nightmare scenario. In addition to looking
foolish, you have also done a very bad thing in
that you have given this would-be buyer a leg
up on any other potential bidder in the market
because this would-be buyer knows what's
under the hood.
So that's the first hypothetical, where the
going-in premise that I have in discussions
with Fred is, "We'd love to have these
discussions with you, but the rules of the game
are if we can't reach agreement on a friendly
basis, your client will not unilaterally go
hostile."
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Here's the second hypothetical-the second
troublesome scenario. In an auction process,
the pressure on the target to get some form of
standstill-and I'll emphasize the words "some
form of standstill," because, as we'll see later,
there are standstills and there are standstills-is
even higher. That's because if you're trying to
run a "process," in quotes, the one thing you
want is to be able to control the methodology
and timing of that process. And what you
really want is an auction where everyone
participating puts forth its best bid.
Now, what you worry about as counsel for the
target is, if there is nothing that restricts a
potential buyer from unilaterally going hostile,
then there's also nothing that restricts the
potential buyer from not putting its best foot
forward in the auction. There's nothing that
prevents the potential buyer from laying back,
trying to buy the target on the cheap with a
lowball bid in the auction, and then trying to
subvert the auction process by unilaterally
going hostile if the highest bidder in the
auction ends up winning the auction at a price
that the potential buyer is willing to top.
That is not a result that I want to be possible in
an auction situation. So in that situation as
well, as counsel for the target, I'm quite
concerned with making sure that my client
controls the playing field.
RICK CLIMAN: So Fred, Gar has given some good
(Moderator) justifications for demanding a standstill in this
situation. As the prospective buyer's counsel,
what do you think about the proposed standstill
provision [in Appendix A] that Gar has
proposed?
FRED GREEN We might try to resist having any standstill at
(Counsel for Buyer): all. After all, this is the earliest possible stage
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GAR BASON:
(Counsel for Target)
of discussions and we haven't decided that
we're interested in doing a deal at all. If we
are ultimately interested in doing a deal, it
would have to be at a price that we would find
attractive, and we don't know today if we will
see eye-to-eye on value. There are no
limitations on what my client, the prospective
buyer, can do today, and we're not asking the
target for any binding commitments. So my
conversation with Gar might begin with "My
client isn't prepared to give up any rights at
this point in time, so why don't we just move
this process along, start the preliminary
conversations and see whether in fact there is a
deal to be done, without anybody asking the
other party to make concessions."
But the bottom line is that some form of
standstill is commonly negotiated. As a
prospective buyer you can resist all you want,
but if the target has made up its mind to require
standstills from all interested parties, in the end
you have to decide whether you want to stay in
the game and go forward or not. In most cases,
going forward requires working out a standstill.
There's one thing you often find buyers
pushing very hard, both in the one-on-one
situation and in the auction sale process.
Remember, the target knows what's in its
mind. It knows whether it's having one-on-one
discussions. It knows whether it's going out to
multiple parties. What the buyer is worried
about-and it's not an unfair worry-is that it
will sign this confidentiality agreement
containing a standstill, it will get fairly un-
illuminating or scanty confidential information
and then the target will cut it off. And the
buyer will feel foolish because it's sitting on
the bench without the ability to play
unilaterally.
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But at the end of the day, most buyers conclude
that this is likely not the agenda of the target.
Gar, do you really need this standstill? We
have reproduced at the beginning of [Appendix
A] a use restriction that you might expect to
find in a confidentiality agreement. We all
know that the basic prohibitions in most M&A-
related confidentiality agreements are: (1) the
buyer must not disclose confidential
information; and (2) the buyer must not use
confidential information except for the specific
purpose of pursuing a transaction with the
target company. This second prohibition is the
use restriction, and it can be written in several
different ways.
Clearly if the use restriction in the
confidentiality agreement signed by the buyer
were identical to the use restriction [in
Appendix A], and if the buyer used your
sensitive information to go hostile on you, then
the buyer would be violating that use
restriction, because the buyer would be
utilizing your confidential information for a
purpose other than pursuing a friendly,
negotiated deal. Why doesn't that give you
enough protection?
Well, I look to the guidance of that famous
M&A lawyer Clint Eastwood for my response,
which is, "How lucky do you feel?" The
answer is, that's a good argument, but if in fact
there is no disagreement in principle as to
whether or not the prospective buyer can
unilaterally go hostile, I don't want there to be
any doubt or question. So humor me and let's
spell it out in a separate standstill provision.
Fred, how much attention do you pay to the
language of the use restriction in the
confidentiality agreement?
2012]1 641







Many practitioners don't focus on the use
restriction with a standstill mindset, and as a
result they may not be sensitive to the fact that
some formulations of the use restriction can
create a potential back-door standstill. "You
shall not use the confidential information
except in connection with your assessment of a
negotiated transaction between the buyer and
the target," is a back-door standstill. "You
shall not use the information except in
connection with a potential acquisition
involving the target" is not a back-door
standstill.
Right. The use of the word "negotiated" is
obviously important, and the use of the word
"between" rather than "involving" is also
important. A hostile acquisition of the target is
not a transaction between the buyer and the
target, it's a transaction between the buyer and
the target's stockholders. But it's pretty clearly
a transaction "involving" the target.
In fact there is a Canadian case, the Research
in Motion case, where there was both a
standstill provision and a separate use
restriction. The parties agreed that the
standstill would expire after a given number of
months. It expired. The use restriction had a
longer term and hadn't expired. The court
enjoined the prospective buyer's hostile
takeover attempt based on the use restriction,
notwithstanding the seemingly clear intent that
the standstill commitments would have an
earlier termination date. So yes, you have to
45. See Certicom Corp. v. Research in Motion (2009), 94 O.R. 3d 511 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.); see also Res. Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54 (N.D.
Ohio 1983) (declining to provide preliminary injunctive relief to target of hostile tender
offer where (i) information subject to confidentiality agreement was not disclosed in SEC
offering materials (and was not required to be so disclosed), (ii) the Court found that the
bidder did not rely on the confidential information in making the tender offer, and
(iii) confidentiality agreement did not contain a standstill provision).
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worry about the wording of the use restriction
as a buyer.46
So, gentlemen, let's start negotiating. Let's
assume there will be a standstill of some sort. I
think you'd both agree that standstills are
frequently executed in this context, perhaps
more frequently than not. Fred, what problems
do you have with the version proposed by Gar
[in Appendix A]?
OK, so we'll agree to some sort of standstill,
but Gar, this one is quite unreasonable. The
time of survival of the standstill, which you
have as three years, has to be greatly limited; it
should not be more than six months. Frankly
the information that you are going to share
with us is going to lose its value in a relatively
short period of time and become stale. So
there's no reason why a protracted time period
is needed.
Six months sounds a little low to me, but I
think we can agree to a slightly longer period
of time. We're going to be giving you our
projections, which are of course rock solid and
will guide you in your understanding of the
target company for at least a couple of years.
46. In late 2011, Vulcan Materials sought preliminary injunctions in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, Answer And Counterclaims of Vulcan Materials Co., Martin Marietta
Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co. (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 7102-CS), and the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Brief for Vulcan Materials,
Vulcan Materials Co. v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. (N.D. Ala. 2011) (No. 11-4248),
against an exchange offer by Martin Marietta, alleging that Martin Marietta's use of
confidential information to launch a hostile exchange offer violated confidentiality
agreements that did not contain standstill provisions, but limited the use of the
confidential information to evaluating a possible business combination transaction
between Vulcan Materials and Martin Marietta (the two actions involve different
confidentiality agreements; the use restriction in the agreement at issue in the Northern
District of Alabama action is less clear). There had not been a decision in either action at
the time this article was written in late January 2012; a decision in the Delaware
Chancery Court action is expected in April 2012.
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Gar, if your projections are so "rock solid,"
will you be willing to include a representation
as to their accuracy?
No, our word processor doesn't have that form.
I would guess nine months or a year is the right
time period for a standstill from our
perspective.
That works. But you've swept in all of your
affiliates to be protected under the umbrella of
this standstill. We are not expecting to get
confidential diligence information about all of
your affiliates, so we would like to cut the
scope back to the target and its subsidiaries.
We can talk about wholly owned versus
majority controlled subsidiaries, but the
provision should be limited to the specific
companies my client is looking to buy and as to
which you're going to be sharing information.
We don't have any upwardly controlling
shareholders, so our affiliates--beyond the
target and its subs-are very limited. We can
work on carving those out.
Gar, if I were representing the prospective
buyer, I might also object to the fact that the
things that are prohibited here seem to go far
beyond overtly hostile actions. You're
prohibiting Fred's client from buying even a
few shares of the target's stock in the open
market and, if I read this language correctly,
from making even friendly acquisition
proposals.
That's right. There's no such thing as a
"friendly" proposal in this context.
Why is that?
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There's no such thing as a "friendly" proposal,
Rick, because if you're out there with our
information and we've decided to go our
separate ways because we can't reach a deal,
it's not acceptable from our perspective for you
to be able to subvert that by unilaterally putting
us in play in the market at what, by definition,
we will at that point consider to be an
inadequate price.
Fred, what else are you going to ask for here?
What about a fall-away provision?
The fall-away provision is one that I would
care about a lot. The fall-away provision
serves as an escape hatch for the buyer. The
target is trying to run an organized process and
wants be able to control, and eventually shut
down, the process. That's the basis for the
standstill. If, in fact, the process gets away
from the target because other bidders who are
not burdened by a standstill go after the target,
or if the target signs a definitive acquisition
agreement with another bidder, and in either of
those instances my client is prepared to offer
more value, my client would like to be free of
the standstill so that it could come in with its
higher offer.
Let's look at the fall-away provision you've
proposed. It's [in Appendix B]. It says that the
standstill falls away-it disappears--under
certain circumstances. One of those
circumstances is a hostile takeover attempt by
another party. If someone else makes a hostile
bid for the target company, then the standstill
falls away. After all, as Fred has said, at this
point the sale process has gotten away from the
target and it's no longer a controlled process.
You're right. It's no longer a controlled
process. But if the standstill falls away and
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Fred's client can jump in at this point, it will be
even more uncontrolled.
That said, I think my reaction is generally that
a fall-away is an acceptable provision. And
while in the abstract it might be nice to
completely control the field of play, if
intervening events occur I think most targets'
counsel would conclude that, you know what,
if there is a destabilizing situation let a hundred
flowers bloom because Fred's client coming
back in and offering more money is likely to be
a good thing.
But wait a second, Gar. Let's assume that this
hostile offer that initially comes in is a real
lowball offer-a clearly inadequate offer that
you're confident you can defend against. Why
should that let the standstill fall away with
respect to Fred's client, which may be able to
make a much stronger and more threatening
hostile offer, in part on the basis of all the
confidential information that you've shared
with Fred's client?
Because you're positing a double lowball.
First you're assuming that there's a lowball
offer made by some other party, and then that
we don't get to an agreement with Fred's client
because its offer is a lowball offer too. I can't
argue that this isn't theoretically possible, but
ultimately the target has usually concluded that
it very much wants to get the buyer that
originally signed the standstill back into the
mix. So a fall-away of some variety strikes me
as a fair request by the buyer. Not surprisingly,
however, what Fred served up is a little broader
than I would like. I certainly believe that a
tender offer should free him up to come on to
the field, but I'm not sure if a tender offer for
only 15% of the target's outstanding shares
should trigger the fall-away.
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As for the other circumstance that triggers the
fall-away--entering into a definitive
acquisition agreement with another
buyer--there is always a robust argument
about whether that's an appropriate trigger.
Again, I want Fred's client to perceive that it's
now or never with respect to reaching an
agreement on price. I want his client to put its
best price forward. If Fred's client knows it
can always put another bid out there if it ends
up being the loser, then there's a real worry it
won't put its best foot forward.
Having said that, though, this is one fall-away
trigger that you often just agree to, because
people start to get ossified in their positions.
At the end of the day, if you have what you
think is the highest price in an auction, it's not
a bad thing that Fred's client wants to come in
and put more money on the table.
Gar, you're a pretty accommodating target's
counsel, given that you're inclined to accept
the fall-away trigger relating to hostile bids.
Joel, when you're advising a target, are you
willing to agree to a standstill fall-away that
says that if a hostile bid is made by someone
else all bets are off and the standstill is gone?
It's partly a question of the context in which it
arises. If the target has decided that it's for
sale and is going to run a process that's going
to end in a sale, I have more sympathy for that
fall-away trigger. But in the situation where
the target is exploring a transaction with one
party and would like to be able to go back to
business as usual if the negotiations don't work
out, I think the fact that some other bid-which
as you say, may or may not be credible-is
made on an unsolicited basis shouldn't
automatically extinguish the standstill.
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Joel, are standstills generally enforceable?
Isn't there an argument on the part of a buyer
who breaches a standstill that the target won't
suffer any damages? Can't a buyer say, "Look,
all I've done is put a higher bid on the table for
the benefit of the target's stockholders. Maybe
I technically breached the standstill, but neither
the target nor any of its stockholders was hurt."
We've seen relatively recently, in the series of
Ventas cases, an example of just what the
damages could be. In Ventas there was an
auction where the confidentiality agreement
signed by the bidders included a standstill.
One party won, as is normally the case, and
another company-HCP-was the loser. The
losing party decided it was going to try to make
a competing bid anyway, in effect to reopen the
auction, even though it was bound by a
standstill.
In the first piece of litigation, the winning
bidder sued the target in Ontario to require the
target to enforce the standstill against HCP, the
losing bidder.47 This suit was based on a
provision of the acquisition agreement between
the target and the winning bidder-a very
typical provision-4hat requires the target not
to waive standstills binding upon competing
bidders.
Then, the first deal with the original winning
bidder was submitted to a vote of the target's
stockholders but failed to achieve the required
vote, arguably because of the offer by HCP.
So the original winning bidder upped its price
in order to get the needed stockholder
47. Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), O.J. No. 908,
2007 ON.C. LEXIS 974, at *1 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) ("This case involves the
interpretation of a purchase agreement entered into following an auction. The issue to be
considered is whether the vendor has an obligation under that agreement to enforce a
standstill agreement signed by an unsuccessful auction participant.").
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approval, closed the transaction and then sued
HCP-the losing bidder that had violated the
standstill--for tortious interference.4 8
It's very easy to identify and quantify the
damages in that case. The original winning
bidder's damages claim is essentially as
follows: "I could have had the company at
$15.00 per share. I wound up paying $16.50
per share, only because you, the interloper,
breached a standstill agreement that was
clearly intended in part for my benefit. I want
to recover the difference in a suit for tortious
interference."
That case survived a motion to dismiss. So I
think you certainly can have real damages in a
case like this.
It's fair to assume that the court that decided
the Research in Motion case,49 which we
mentioned earlier-4he court that found an
implied standstill in a use restriction-would
have enforced an express standstill as well.
And there are some other cases enforcing
standstill agreements. So the answer to your
question is generally, yes, standstills should be
enforceable, and their breach can give rise to
serious damages.
48. Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 301 (6th Cir. 2011) ("By April 9, 2007,
a sufficient number of proxies had been entered against the Purchase Agreement to
prevent its approval. On April 11, 2007, to salvage the deal and avoid injury to its
reputation, Ventas increased its original offer of $15.00 per unit to $16.50 per unit. The
unitholders approved Ventas' increased offer on April 19, 2007, and the deal closed on
April 26, 2007. Ventas commenced this diversity action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 soon
thereafter. On May 3, 2007, Ventas filed a Complaint against HCP in the district court,
asserting Kentucky state law claims of tortious interference with contract, and tortious
interference with a prospective advantage. Ventas alleged that HCP improperly
interfered with its valid expectancy that the Sunrise unitholders would approve its $15.00
per unit offer to purchase Sunrise, causing Ventas to raise its offer to $16.50 per unit.")
(citations omitted).
49. See Research in Motion, 94 O.R. 3d 511.
2012] 649
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
There is also the Topps decisionso in 2007 in
which the Delaware Court of Chancery
required the target to release a standstill, but
that was a remedy to cure a defective sale
process. It wasn't an indictment of standstills
per se. In general, yes, I believe that standstills
will be respected by the courts."
IV. EXCLUSIVITY AGREEMENT
RICK CLIMAN: Let's turn now to another preliminary
(Moderator) document, the exclusivity agreement.5 2  This
document is proposed by prospective buyers,
as opposed to standstills, which are proposed
by target companies. You'll find the form of
exclusivity agreement proposed by Fred, the
buyer's counsel, [in Appendix C]. You'll find
50. See Upper Deck. Co. v. Topps Co. (In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig.), 926 A.2d
58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
51. For other cases relating to standstills, see Enterra Corp. v. SGS Ass., 600 F.
Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that board did not breach its fiduciary duties in
approving and declining to amend standstill agreement with a substantial stockholder);
Crescott Inv. Assocs. v. Davis, No. 10839, 1989 WL 155469 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1989)
(interpreting standstill agreement not to bar the consent solicitation that the target sought
to enjoin); ONEOK, Inc. v. S. Union Co., No. 99-CV-345-H(M), 1999 WL 34861197
(N.D. Okla. May 11, 1999) (finding that successful bidder was a third party beneficiary
of, and entitled to a temporary restraining order to enforce, target's standstill agreement
with subsequent bidder); Aurizon Mines Ltd. v. Northgate Minerals Corp. (2006), 19
B.L.R. (4th) 318; 57 B.C.L.R. (4th) 137 (Can. B.C. 2006) (holding target entitled to an
injunction enforcing a standstill agreement against a take-over bid (the Canadian
equivalent of a tender offer) even though no confidential information had been shared);
LNB Bancorp, Inc. v. Osborne, No. 1:09 CV 643, 2011 WL 6012324 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
30, 2011) (holding target entitled to an injunction enforcing standstill agreement included
in a litigation settlement agreement with a substantial stockholder). A target board does
not breach its Revlon duties by requiring all bidders to sign a standstill agreement as a
condition to access to confidential information. Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, No. 16301,
1998 WL 892631 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998); Alliance Gaming Corp. v. Bally Gaming
Int'l, Inc., No. 1444, 1995 WL 523543 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 1995); In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
S'holder Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal refused, 540 A.2d 1089 (Del.
1988).
52. See MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 385-94; see also ARTHUR
FLEISCHER JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUssMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS § 14.04 (7' ed. 2010); SIMON M. LORNE, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS:
NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 2:23 (2003).
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Gar's very aggressive response on behalf of the
target company [in Appendix D].
Fred, what does your draft exclusivity
agreement say? What are the salient
provisions?
This is all about trying to buy a little time to
conduct due diligence and get a deal
negotiated. We want to make sure that, during
a reasonable and limited period of time, the
target is going to stand down in terms of
discussions with others, and dedicate its
management team to negotiations with my
client. So essentially, we are asking that the
target not solicit acquisition proposals from
anyone else, not engage in negotiations with
anyone else and agree to keep my client
apprised of any incoming unsolicited
acquisition inquiries so we know what's going
on. In the meantime the buyer is going to
dedicate all the resources necessary so that in a
short period of time we can get the deal
documented and signed.
We're not going to do a full-blown negotiation
of this document today. But I do want to pose
some basic questions that relate specifically to
the use of exclusivity agreements in the public
company context.
Gar, how frequently do you see these
agreements in connection with potential
acquisitions of public targets, outside the
context of a target running a formal auction-
type sale process with multiple bidders?
Exclusivity agreements tend to be somewhat
unusual in public company deals. Where the
target has any leverage at all they're almost
unheard of. Typically, your ability as a target
to fight off a request for an exclusivity
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agreement is pretty good.
Assuming I'm willing to entertain entering into
an exclusivity agreement at all, my reaction to
Fred's main points is that I may agree not to
solicit and not to talk to other prospective
buyers, but I'm certainly not going to provide
information on other bids that may come in.
What you focus on as the target is that the
prospective buyer is giving you nothing in the
exclusivity agreement. To give a contractual
undertaking that you'll turn over valuable
information about other bids is normally an
anathema to a target company.
In the private company context it's not unusual
to see exclusivity periods of 45 days, 60 days,
or even longer. What's the typical duration of
the exclusivity period when the target company
is publicly traded?
Shorter. The first thing that the target might
say is, "We won't agree to binding exclusivity,
but our management team is spending 100% of
their time with you now, so as a practical
matter, you don't have to worry about us
spending time with other bidders." That's so-
called "soft" exclusivity.
When the buyer pushes back and says, "Soft
exclusivity doesn't do it for me," you would
normally start the negotiations at two weeks.
And you would probably get beaten into giving
30 days. But every day is considered a huge
give on your part.
Fred, in Gar's response [in Appendix D], he's
done a number of things. First he's added a
fiduciary exception at the end of paragraph 1.
It basically says that notwithstanding the
specific prohibitions in the exclusivity
agreement, the target can negotiate with other
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bidders during the exclusivity period if failing
to do so would give rise to a breach of the
fiduciary duties of the target company's board
of directors. Are you going to object to this?
Absolutely.
Is that sort of fiduciary exception really
required here, and if not, why not?
It's certainly not required, and it completely
vitiates the benefit of the exclusivity agreement
for the prospective buyer. Gar, we're trying to
assure that your client and mine have set aside
time to get this deal negotiated. The buyer
really wants to do this deal, and has put a price
on the table that your client is excited about.
We just need a little time and we'll get the deal
done. If along the way a higher bid is lobbed
in and your client loses interest in doing a deal
with us, then you should simply wait out the
exclusivity period. The "rope-a-dope"
treatment is available-there's nothing wrong
with simply waiting things out. You come to
the end of the exclusivity period soon enough,
and the parties can go their separate ways. So
Gar, there's no need to negotiate for an early
termination right.
At the end of the day, Gar, I assume you agree
with that.
Yes, I try to keep a straight face when I request
a fiduciary exception, but the fiduciary
exception is really the kind of lawyer's trick
that people don't like. Fred's right. If business
people agree to the concept of exclusivity, then
it's just kind of trying to take it away with the
fiduciary exception, and if the exclusivity
period is short enough you can always do the
"rope-a-dope."
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So fiduciary exceptions may have their place in
the definitive acquisition agreement, but in
most cases they are inappropriate in a stand-
alone exclusivity agreement that is put into
place before the definitive acquisition
agreement is signed.
Gar, you deleted the provision requiring your
client, the target, to disclose to the prospective
buyer the terms of any acquisition proposal or
offer that comes in from another party during
the exclusivity period. Doesn't the prospective
buyer have some sort of right to
transparency-a right to know everything
that's going on vis i vis other bidders?
A prospective buyer who signs a definitive
acquisition agreement with a price in it and
with obligations binding on the prospective
buyer has the right to get a full panoply of
information when there's a counter-bid. But
prior to signing an acquisition agreement the
buyer is giving us absolutely nothing, and
we're restricting our freedom. So the last thing
I'm willing to do is give the buyer valuable
pricing information when it hasn't given me
anything in return for it.
Fred, do you agree with that?
Yes and no. The buyer is going to be putting a
lot of resources into getting this deal done.
And frankly, if there is a point along the way
where a third party has come in with an offer
that looks like it might be preferable to ours,
we'd like to know about it. We're acting in
good faith and if our deal is not going to
happen, we'll understand that, but we'd like to
stand down rather than waste our time.
However, I am sympathetic to Gar's position.
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Why do you need the specific terms of other
bids? That's what's confusing to us.
Gar, isn't there a risk that someone will come
in and make an unsolicited offer at a price
lower than the price Fred's client has on the
table? What do you do then?
Exactly. My nightmare as the target is that
Fred's client is thinking of $40 per share, and a
bid comes in from someone else at $32. Fred's
client thinks, "Whoa, I can beat this other bid
by offering only $34." I don't want Fred's
client to have a notion of what the market-
clearing price might be. As a buyer, you have
a right to get that by signing a binding,
definitive acquisition agreement with a price in
it.
Isn't that issue accentuated because, for the
most part, the only time you're going to get the
target to sign an exclusivity agreement is when
the target is in a position of weakness to start
with?
I'm amazed, candidly, at how often I see this
"transparency" provision in stand-alone
exclusivity agreements. My sympathies on this
issue lie with Gar's position. Fred, I assume
you'd agree that if a target company has any
leverage at all and pushes back on this issue
against a prospective buyer who has no
obligations whatsoever at this point, the
prospective buyer should lose the argument.
I totally agree. You can give it a try, but if the
target's counsel identifies and holds firm on the
issue, you should just give up and move on.
5 3
53. For an example of a litigated dispute involving an exclusivity agreement, see
Wachovia Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Wachovia
sought a declaratory judgment that its merger with Wells Fargo was not prohibited by an
exclusivity agreement entered into by Citigroup and Wachovia prior to Wachovia's
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V. DEFINITIVE ACQUISITION AGREEMENT-TENDER OFFER
MECHANICS
RICK CLIMAN: Let's move away from the preliminary deal
(Moderator) documents to the full-blown definitive
acquisition agreement, which begins [in
Appendix E]. As you would expect, the
definitive agreement for a two-step deal covers
both the front-end tender offer and the back-
end merger.
The excerpt [at the beginning of Appendix E] is
an example of the first section of the buyer's
draft of the definitive acquisition agreement.
This section provides something of a blueprint
for the buyer's front-end cash tender offer.
Section 1.1(d) provides that the tender offer
has to stay open for a minimum of 20 business
days, a little less than a month, as required by
the SEC tender offer rules.54
Section 1.1(b) provides that the buyer doesn't
have to purchase shares tendered in the tender
offer unless certain specified conditions are
satisfied, including the all-important minimum
condition, which is spelled out in the first
sentence of section 1.1(b).
Joel, to set the stage for the upcoming
negotiation, and for those in our audience who
merger with Wells Fargo. Id. Citigroup and Wells Fargo eventually reached a settlement
whereby Citigroup received $100 million to resolve the claims. See Eric Dash, Wells
Fargo to Pay Citigroup $100 Million for Wachovia Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/wells-to-pay-citi- 1 00-million-for-wachovia-
claims.
54. See infra Appendix E, § 1.1(d). Rule 14e- 1 requires that any tender offer be held
open for at least 20 business days from the date the tender offer is first published or sent
to security holders. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2011). Since Rule 14d-7 gives each
tendering shareholder the right to withdraw the tendered securities at any time the tender
offer remains open, the buyer cannot acquire any tendered securities until the offer
expires. See id. § 240.14d-7; see also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Commentator)
are not intimately familiar with the two-step
acquisition structure, maybe you can shed
some light on how all this is stitched together.
Sure. The important thing to remember when
you look at provisions like those in section 1 is
that this is where all the action is in the
acquisition agreement. The key issues all
relate to the first step because once shares are
taken down in the tender offer the deal is over
except for some back-end mechanics. At that
stage the interloper risk is over, because the
buyer owns a majority of the target's
outstanding voting stock. The obligation of the
buyer to complete the back-end merger and to
buy the remaining untendered shares is going
to be as unconditional as the parties can make
it. Basically the only conditions to the
consummation of the back-end merger would
relate to illegality and the like-the back-end
merger can't take place if there's an injunction
against it in place.ss So you have to focus on
the front-end tender offer-related provisions as
though they really define the deal terms.
So what do we have here? To start, we have a
provision requiring that the tender offer be
commenced promptly, sometimes within a
certain, limited number of days. Years ago you
didn't need that because there was an SEC rule
that required the buyer to commence its tender
55. For an example of a provision in a definitive acquisition agreement specifying
the conditions to the completion of a back-end merger, see infra Appendix Q, which
reproduces § 8.01 of the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated July 14, 2011, among
BHP Billiton Limited, BHP Billiton Petroleum (North America) Inc., North America
Holdings II Inc., and Petrohawk Energy Corporation. The stockholder approval
condition in § 8.01 is not substantively significant because the buyer is obligated to vote
the shares it purchases in the tender offer in favor of that approval and, as a consequence
of the minimum condition in the tender offer, the buyer's vote will necessarily be
sufficient without regard to the votes of other stockholders.
56. See infra Appendix E, § 1.1(a).
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offer within five business days after
57announcement, but that's gone, so you
provide something contractually. The target
doesn't want to leave it in the buyer's hands to
decide when to start its tender offer. There will
clearly be limitations on the buyer's ability to
vary the terms of the tender offer from those
that were agreed. This is a negotiated
transaction, and the buyer has to stick with the
deal that was negotiated."
The tender offer conditions are going to be of
great interest to both parties because, again,
this is the only part of the deal where
conditionality really is in play. For example, if
the buyer wants a last clear opportunity to walk
away from the deal because of a material
adverse change in the target's business, it's
going to have to include that walk right in the
tender offer conditions, not in the merger
conditions. Once the buyer buys shares in the
tender offer, it's over-the closing of the back
end is afait accompli.
Lastly, there is going to be a lot of focus from
both sides on what happens when you get to
the end of the initial tender offer period.
Assume, for example, that you haven't hit the
minimum condition. A condition has failed,
but I don't know that it's obvious that both
parties will agree that the buyer can just walk
57. Rule 14d-2(b), which became effective in 1980, required that a tender offer
commence within five business days after it was first publicly announced. Tender Offers,
Exchange Act Release No. 6158; Investment Company Act Release 10958, 1979 WL
182305, at *7 (Nov. 29, 1979). The SEC noted in the adopting release that this
requirement would pre-empt state anti-takeover statutes, which typically required a
public filing before the tender offer commenced. The Commission concluded that pre-
emption was appropriate since existing anti-takeover statutes "frustrate[d] the operation
and purposes of the Williams Act." Id. at *8. The five business day commencement rule
was eliminated in 2000. Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7760, Exchange Act Release 34-42055, Investment
Company Act Release No. 24107, 70 SEC Docket 2229 (Oct. 22, 1999).
58. See infra Appendix E, § 1.1(c).
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Please explain the minimum condition, Joel.
What percentage level is typically set for that
condition?
The minimum condition is typically going to
be set at the lowest level that permits the buyer
to force the second-step merger. In Delaware
that would be acquisition of a majority of the
target's outstanding shares,59 typically fully
diluted, because you don't want the risk that
new shares could be issued after you take down
tendered shares in the tender offer. In other
words, it will be set at a level that makes the
second-step merger really nothing but
mechanics.
In other words, 50% plus one share.
Fifty percent plus one share, less whatever the
buyer already owned going into the transaction.
If you include the minimum condition and
nothing else relating to it, then in the event the
minimum condition is not satisfied, the buyer
could walk away at the end of 20 business
days. But the target might have something to
say about that. That's where provisions
relating to the mandatory extension of the
tender offer come in.60
On the other hand, you wouldn't want the
buyer to be able to get to the end of the 20
business day period and say, "Well, 80% of the
target's outstanding shares have been tendered,
and that's a great result, but it would really
59. See Delaware General Corporation Law § 251(c), which requires that "a
majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon" be voted for
the adoption of a merger agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 25 1(c) (West 2011).
60. See infra Appendix E, § 1.1(d).
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make my life easier if I could do the back-end
merger as a short-form merger, so I'm going to
extend the tender offer for another ten days so I
can try to get enough additional shares to get
me to the 90% ownership level." Because if
the buyer were to do that, both the buyer and
the target would remain subject to deal risk.
Keep in mind that if you extend the tender
offer, you can't buy any shares, because
withdrawal rights have to be extended to
tendering shareholders through the completion
of the offer.61 So while it is theoretically
possible a buyer might want to follow that
strategy, I'm not sure that in reality a buyer
would be willing to put its deal in jeopardy.
And the target would certainly not be terribly
receptive to that either.
In short, what you tend to see in these
provisions are carefully crafted and negotiated
provisions defining how the tender offer is
made, what its terms are going to be and the
specific circumstances under which it may be,
or must be, extended.
RICK CLIMAN: Joel, you mentioned two relevant thresholds:
(Moderator) the minimum condition threshold, which is
50% plus one share; and the 90% threshold,
which is the ownership threshold that the buyer
has to achieve in order to do the back-end
merger as a short-form, rather than a long-
form, merger.62 But just to be clear, even if
you don't hit that 90% short-form merger
61. Rule 14d-7 gives each tendering shareholder the right to withdraw the tendered
securities "at any time that the offer remains open," including during any extension. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (2011).
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2011). A short-form merger does not
require any vote of the target's stockholders to complete, and accordingly does not
require the filing of any proxy statement or information statement. Therefore, if a short-
form merger can be effected, it can be completed immediately upon completion of the
front-end tender offer.
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threshold, as long as you get above 50%, the
back end is afait accompli, correct?
Absolutely. Even if the buyer owns only 51%
of the target's outstanding stock, it has enough
votes to guarantee stockholder approval of a
long-form merger in Delaware. I can think of
only one example in all the years I've been
doing this where a two-step transaction
actually failed after the completion of the first
step. In general, once the bidder has
purchased the shares tendered in the tender
offer, the back end is certain to close.
Right. Once you've completed the front end,
even with less than 90% of the target's
outstanding shares, it's "game over." And it
really doesn't matter whether the back-end
merger is going to be done as a short-form
merger or a long-form merger. A long-form
merger will take longer than a short-form
merger to complete, but one way or another,
the back end will ultimately be completed.
Rachel, your firm is frequently retained by
buyers to serve as information agent in friendly
tender offers. What does this entail, and more
importantly, what determines how easy it's
going to be to get tenders of 50% plus one
share to satisfy the minimum condition, or
better yet, 90% of the target's outstanding
shares?
When we're asked to act as information agent,
the first thing we have to figure out is who
owns the target's outstanding shares. Who are
the right people to contact? How concentrated
63. In Farley Inc.'s 1989 acquisition of West Point-Pepperell Inc., approximately
95% of the outstanding shares were acquired in the tender offer, but the second step
merger did not occur because the needed financing failed. See Farley Behind on
Pepperell Debt Payments, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/
06/27/business/farley-behind-on-pepperell-debt-payments.html?sre-pm.
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are the "positions"? How far down the list do
we have to go? That will determine how easy
or difficult our job will be.
Rachel, anyone who has read the dense
documentation prepared in connection with a
tender offer sees references to "notices of
guaranteed delivery" or, in the vernacular of
information agents, "protects." What role do
notices of guaranteed delivery play?
Notices of guaranteed delivery enable holders
to tender shares in the tender offer even if the
share certificates are not readily available. A
notice of guaranteed delivery is essentially a
promise, guaranteed by a financial institution,
to deliver the share certificates within three
business days. For purposes of the tender offer
documents, the shares are deemed to have been
properly tendered when the notice of
guaranteed delivery is given.
Joel, as a matter of state law, do shares
represented by share certificates that haven't
yet been tendered but that are subject to notices
of guaranteed delivery count toward the 90%
short-form merger threshold?
Short and simple answer--no. Ultimately a
notice of guaranteed delivery is simply a
promise, made by an institution that is thought
to be creditworthy, to deliver the shares. But
it's still just a promise. The short-form merger
statute in Delaware, and in every other state
I'm aware of, requires that you be the owner of
the requisite percentage of the shares, not just
have a contract to buy them.M
64. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (2011) (providing for short-form mergers
where "at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of stock of a corporation ...
is owned by another corporation") (emphasis added).
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Rachel, is it fair to say that most of the shares
tendered in a friendly tender offer are generally
tendered at the very end of the tender offer
period? Bear in mind that tendering
stockholders have their withdrawal rights
throughout the pendency of the tender offer,65
so there is no apparent disadvantage to
tendering early. A stockholder who has
tendered his shares can always withdraw them
and get them back before the tender offer
expires. As a practical matter, do stockholders
nonetheless typically wait until near the end of
the tender offer to tender their shares?
Yes. People tend to wait until the last minute
to tender. So the last 24 hours before the
expiration of the tender offer can certainly be
an interesting time.
Joel, let's assume that when you get down to
the witching hour the buyer ends up having
gotten only, say, 85% of the target's
outstanding shares in the tender offer. You've
talked about how it can be advantageous to get
to 90% so you can do your back-end merger as
a short-form merger in Delaware. Even though
the back-end merger is a fait accompli at any
level above 50%, if the buyer can get to 90%,
the buyer can do the back-end merger right
away as a short-form merger, without the need
for a vote of stockholders or the filing of a
proxy or information statement with the SEC.
What are some of the techniques a buyer can
utilize to get to 90% in order to avoid the cost
and delay associated with having to do a long-
form back-end merger?
There are several, Rick, and some of them
require some advance planning. They're not
all things you can suddenly decide to do once
65. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7; see also supra notes 54 and 61.
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you've seen that only 85% of the outstanding
shares have come in.
The first alternative is one we talked about
before. You could extend the tender offer and
just go back and beat the bushes some more
and get some more shares tendered. But as we
discussed, the problem with that is that all of
the shares that you already received are still in
play at that point. They're subject to
withdrawal rights and you've just added a great
deal of uncertainty to the transaction by
extending the tender offer. In any event, it's
very likely the acquisition agreement is going
to prohibit the buyer from extending the tender
offer under these circumstances.
What are the other alternatives? Well, the SEC
rules now permit a so-called "subsequent
offering period" after the bidder has taken
down the shares that have been tendered and
closed the tender offer.6 7 Withdrawal rights to
those shares are gone, and then, in effect, you
make a second tender offer-a "subsequent
offering"-for a limited period of time at the
same price and on the same terms as the
original tender offer to see what else you can
take down. You have to have disclosed the
possibility of a subsequent offering period in
the original disclosure document, and the
acquisition agreement has to permit it, 68 but
66. See infra Appendix E, § 1.1(d); see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying
text.
67. See Rule 14d-ll. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-11 (2011). A "subsequent offering
period" permits the acquirer to acquire additional shares of the target after the termination
of the tender offer. While a subsequent offering period was initially limited in length to
20 days, the SEC removed the maximum time limit on the length of a subsequent offering
period to prevent conflict with foreign jurisdictions in both domestic and foreign tender
offers. Commission Guidance and Revisions to the Cross-Border Tender Offer,
Exchange Offer, Rights Offerings, and Business Combination Rules and Beneficial
Ownership Reporting Rules for Certain Foreign Institutions, Securities Act Release No.
33-8957, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58597, 94 SEC Docket 339 (Oct. 9, 2008).
68. See infra Appendix E, § 1.1(d)(iv).
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this is a much lower risk strategy for going for
additional shares than extending the original
tender offer. It does have the issue, though,
that you have to pay for the shares that you
bought in the initial tender offer while you're
going through the subsequent offering period.
This can be tricky if you're financing the
transaction.
The subsequent offering period, which became
available in 2000 with the adoption of Rule
14d- 11, has in fact proven to be quite valuable.
In a situation where the buyer receives tenders
approaching 90% but the target doesn't have
enough authorized shares to enable the buyer to
benefit from the exercise of a top-up option,69 a
useful strategy is for the buyer to close on the
tender offer and put out an announcement that
informs the market that it has purchased
whatever percentage of the target's shares
came in and that it will commence a brief
subsequent offering period after which either
(1) a short-form merger can be accomplished
because 90% of the target's shares were
purchased and all remaining minority
stockholders will be paid the purchase price
immediately in a short-form merger, or (2) the
buyer will pursue a long-form merger which
will result in the stockholders who have not
tendered being paid that same price, but two or
three months later. And you know, magically
people wake up and realize that they missed
the boat on the original tender offer and don't
want to wait months longer than others to be
paid. You find in many instances that within a
few days after commencing a subsequent
offering period, you're at 90%.
When it originally proposed the adoption of
Rule 14d- 11, the SEC noted that the
69. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Commentator)
subsequent offering period would be similar to
the extended offering period available under
the U.K. regulatory regime; 70 and since the
adoption of Rule 14d- 11, the subsequent
offering period has in fact proven to be a useful
tool for buyers in the U.S.
Joel, aside from the subsequent offering period,
what other alternatives are available to a buyer
that owns less than 90% of the target's
outstanding shares after completion of the
tender offer?
There's something else you can do, if the
acquisition agreement and confidentiality
agreement you signed permit it. You can go
into the market and try to buy some additional
shares after you close the tender offer. You
can't do that while the tender offer is open-
SEC Rule 14e-5n prohibits that. But if you
close the tender offer and there is still a
meaningful market, and if you're not
contractually prohibited from doing so, you can
just go out into the market and buy some more
shares.
Finally, and perhaps the most interesting
alternative of all because it comes with very
few downsides, is the so-called top-up option,
which is an option built into the definitive
acquisition agreement under which the buyer
can buy additional, newly-issued shares
directly from the target, generally at the tender
70. Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, Securities Act
Release No. 33-7607, Exchange Act Release 34-40633, Investment Company Act
Release No. 23520, 1998 WL 767321 (proposed Nov. 3, 1998) ("The proposed
subsequent offering period would be similar to the extended offering period that
sometimes applies to tender offers made in the United Kingdom subject to the City Code
on Takeovers and Mergers."); see also THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE
CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS r. 31 (10th ed. 2011) (U.K.), available at
http://www.thetakeover panel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-5 (2011).
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offer price but not necessarily for cash, to get
the buyer to the 90% ownership threshold.72
Lisa, our statistics show just how universal top-
up options have become.7 3 They are included
in a vast majority of friendly tender offer deals.
But these top-up options have been a frequent
target of plaintiffs' lawyers in recent years.
What issues have these plaintiffs' lawyers been
raising, and have dealmakers actually been
changing their practices as a result of these
challenges?
There was a flurry of judicial activity in 2010
and 2011 addressing top-up options in EV3,
American Pasta75 and Cogent76 among other
cases. The challenges advanced by plaintiffs'
lawyers were two-fold. The first type of
challenge was based on a so-called "appraisal
dilution" theory-a contention that the top-up
shares would have to be counted as part of the
shares outstanding for appraisal purposes.77
72. For an example of a top-up option, see infra Appendix R, which reproduces
§ 1.04 of the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of July 14, 2011, among BHP
Billiton Limited, BHP Billiton Petroleum (North America) Inc., North America Holdings
II Inc., and Petrohawk Energy Corporation.
73. Top-up options were included in 97% of the cash tender offers surveyed in the
2011 ABA Study, supra note 44.
74. Olson v. EV3, Inc., No. 5583-VCL, 2011 WL 704409 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2011).
75. Transcript of Record, In re Am. Italian Pasta Co. S'holder Litig., No. 5610-VCN
(Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2010) (approving a Memorandum of Understanding in which
American Italian Pasta Co. abandoned its top-up option). For details of this agreement,
see Am. Italian Pasta Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 15, 2010).
76. In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487 (Del. Ch. 2010).
77. According to the "appraisal dilution theory," a top-up option allows for the
issuance of a significant number of shares at less than fair value. Because the top-up
shares are outstanding at the time of the short-form merger, it has been argued that the
value of current stockholders' shares is significantly reduced as a result of the dilutive
effect of a substantial increase in the number of shares outstanding. See EV3, 2011 WL
704409, at *3; Cogent, 7 A.3d at 507; see also Transcript of Record, In re Gateway, Inc.
S'holders Litig., No. 3219-VCN (Del. Ch. Sep. 14, 2007); Edward B. Micheletti & Sarah
T. Runnells, The Rise and (Apparent) Fall of the Top-Up "Appraisal Dilution" Claim,
15 M & A LAW. 9, 9 (2011). Although it is not entirely clear whether top-up shares
would be considered by the Court of Chancery in an appraisal proceeding, a provision is
now included in most top-up option provisions stipulating that the fair value of any shares
for which appraisal is properly demanded will be determined without regard to any
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The second theory focused on the possible
invalidity of the top-up shares.
I think practitioners have figured out how to
head off both these types of challenges now, so
we'll see far less of these issues raised in the
future. Folks are putting language into their
merger agreements confirming that you're not
going to count the newly issued top-up shares
in an appraisal proceeding.79  And, to avoid
validity-based challenges, practitioners are
being more cautious in making sure that the
resolutions authorizing the issuance of the top-
up shares and approving the consideration
payable for them are properly prepared. So, I
think the challenges have been addressed, and
although there are still some lingering
complaints in the Delaware Court of Chancery,
no one is moving for expedition on them.
dilution caused by the issuance of top-up shares. See EV3, 2011 WL 704409, at *8-11
(suggesting that the Court of Chancery would not take top-up shares into account in an
appraisal proceeding and stating that parties can agree not to count top-up shares for
purposes of appraisal); Cogent, 7 A.3d at 507 (indicating that such a provision would be
permissible).
78. The "invalidity theory" is based on the procedural requirements under the DGCL
that the issuance of stock must be specifically authorized by the board of directors and
that consideration received by a corporation for the issuance of shares of stock must be
equal to at least the par value of the shares. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 153(a), 157(d)
(West 2011). A merger agreement typically provides that top-up shares may be
purchased by the buyer with a promissory note which is typically due at some point after
the acquirer has completed the back-end short form merger. Because the acquirer could
then forgive the debt, plaintiffs have argued that the consideration received by the
corporation for the top-up shares is essentially illusory. See Cogent, 7 A.3d at 506-07.
Another variation of the invalidity theory is that the DGCL requires that option terms,
including the consideration to be provided for the shares, be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation "or in a resolution adopted by the board of directors providing for the
creation and issue of such rights or options, and, in every case, shall be set forth or
incorporated by reference in the instrument or instruments evidencing such rights or
options." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 153(b) (West 2011); see also EV3, 2011 WL 704409,
at *12-13. If the parties fail to specify the material terms of the promissory note in the
merger agreement, the Court of Chancery has found that there is a "strong argument" that
the top-up shares would be invalidly issued if the top-up option were exercised. See id at
*12.
79. See id. at *8-11.
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Rick, isn't the biggest single issue with top-up
options having enough authorized shares?
The math becomes a stunning problem when
you actually do it.
The math can indeed become daunting. In
order to enable the buyer to get from an 80%
ownership level to a 90% ownership level, the
target company has to double the number of
shares it has outstanding.80  It's not at all
inconceivable that the number of shares needed
to be issued to the buyer to enable it to get to
the 90% ownership threshold could exceed the
number of authorized shares that the target
company has available for issuance.
Before we begin the actual negotiation of the
definitive agreement provisions, I'd like to turn
to Tom Johnson of Abernathy MacGregor to
get a brief summary of what role the public
relations and communications specialists play
in friendly tender offer deals, and what
challenges they face in advising their clients on
these types of deals.
At the stage in the process where a definitive
acquisition agreement is being negotiated, we
spend a lot of time trying to figure out the
answers to some key questions: What are the
key messages that need to be heard, and what
are the audiences that need to hear them, in
order to help sell this deal? What levers can
80. Assume, for example, that the target company has 100,000,000 shares
outstanding and that the buyer (which owned no shares of target company stock before
the closing of the tender offer) acquires 80,000,000 target company shares in the tender
offer, representing 80% of the target's outstanding shares. In order to increase its
percentage ownership from 80% to 90%, the buyer would have to acquire an additional
100,000,000 newly-issued shares from the target company. After acquiring the
100,000,000 newly-issued top-up shares, the buyer would own a total of 180,000,000
shares of the target's stock, and there would be a total of 200,000,000 shares of the
target's stock outstanding. The 180,000,000 shares held by the buyer would constitute
exactly 90% of the total number of outstanding target shares.
6692012]
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we use to help get those key messages to the
optimal audience? Ultimately our role is to
help use those messages to mitigate deal risk.
Obviously, the investor base from which we're
going to go out and help solicit tenders is a key
audience here, and we're going to spend a lot
of time figuring out how to communicate with
them. But we're also going to spend a lot of
time talking to the executives of and the
lawyers and other advisors for both companies
in order to understand whether there is
regulatory risk and, if there is, what the
regulators need to hear. Are there key
customers that we need to contact on day one?
Or local politicians? Employees? Labor
unions? We may even need to reach out to
ISS81 if we think they may be a factor.
We're trying to pre-script all those messages,
and figure out where we might find pockets of
resistance. Part of our job is to proactively
help mitigate the interloper risk that was
mentioned earlier.
We'll do a lot of scenario planning while the
companies and their advisors are hammering
out the definitive acquisition agreement. What
do we do if there is a leak? What do we do if a
regulator unexpectedly sticks its head up?
What do we do if we don't hit the minimum
tender condition? And we'll try to walk
through as much of that as we can ahead of
time so if any of these situations occurs, we're
prepared for it. We want to be in a position to
pull something off the shelf that we can
immediately implement.
81. See supra notes 40-41.
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Joel mentioned how important the tender offer
conditions are.82 Let's begin the negotiation of
the definitive acquisition agreement by taking a
look at the tender offer conditions themselves.
They begin [near the end of Appendix E, under
the caption "Annex I, Conditions to the
Offer"].
Gar, as a preliminary matter, let me ask you
this: are the negotiations relating to these
tender offer conditions materially different
from the negotiations you'd have over the
merger closing conditions in a one-step deal?
Or are they essentially the same?
They're essentially the same exercise. There
may have been a time at which the conditions
in a two-step deal deviated from the conditions
in a one-step deal, but I'd say they have
converged over the years.
Gar, as counsel to the target company, can you
summarize your general mindset in considering
these tender offer conditions?
Yes. I'm a paranoid man, basically because I
look at every condition as a potential way that
the deal won't go forward. The trench warfare
back and forth is for me to try to tighten up
every condition so that the opportunity for the
buyer to walk away is as limited as possible.
One of the worst things that can happen to a
target company is to have a deal announced
and then not go forward, because the fickle
marketplace tends to assume the worst-that
82. See supra text following note 58.
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the buyer discovered something serious and
troublesome about the target's business. The
target company may well be branded as
"damaged goods," particularly if its employee
or customer base has eroded as a result of the
deal announcement.
It's easy to understand why Gar would be so
concerned about making sure these tender offer
conditions are crafted narrowly. Basically Gar
wants to try to make sure that only something
truly catastrophic can result in the failure of a
tender offer condition to be satisfied. Fred, can
I assume you don't see eye-to-eye with Gar on
this point?
"Paranoid man" also describes my perspective
on this issue. The buyer is very interested in
making sure it can get the benefit of its
bargain. We've agreed to pay a full price and
are happy to do so as long as the business is "as
described." But we are going to be pushing
hard to include conditions that will protect
against having to close if there is a material
variation from what was represented.
Let's talk about some specific tender offer
conditions. We'll only have time to go through
one or two.
One of the most controversial tender offer
conditions is the "material adverse effect" or
so-called "MAE" condition in clause "(c)".
Fred has provided us with a definition of
"material adverse effect" [at the end of
Appendix E], and Gar has provided a
responsive target-favorable definition [in
Appendix F]. Not surprisingly the two
definitions don't look anything alike.
Gar, please summarize what you didn't like
about Fred's proposed definition and what
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Just about anything could potentially be a
"material adverse effect" in Fred's definition
because the definition not only covers material
adverse effects on the target company's
business as a whole, but also on its cash
position, liquidity, working capital, assets,
liabilities, cash flow, financial performance
and--my favorite- "prospects."
I'm seeking to narrow the scope of this
definition. I will argue to Fred that under
Delaware law only something absolutely huge
can constitute a material adverse effect. I have
support for that proposition in the IBP-Tyson
decision.83
As a commercial matter I also believe that the
appropriate allocation of risk puts the risk of
minor problems on the buyer. Again, the only
thing that should give the buyer the ability to
call off the deal is something absolutely huge.
That's what I'm trying to reflect in my
proposed definition.
Fred, let's respond to Gar's objections one at a
time. First of all, let's focus on this long litany
of financial terms-m-ash position, liquidity,
working capital, assets, liabilities. You're
cherry picking balance sheet items. Shouldn't
the concept of material adverse effect focus on
the target company-and its subsidiaries, if it
has any-as a whole, and not on individual
pieces of the target company? Isn't that a fair
comment?
It's a fair comment. The typical formulation is
to base the definition on effects that are
adverse to the business or operations of the
83. In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
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target company and its subsidiaries, taken as a
whole, and in practice I would not spend time
trying to define an MAE based on an event at
one company in the group that did not
adversely affect the group as a whole. Much of
what Gar has proposed in his mark-up is
reasonable. There are just a few items that
we're going to have to tinker with.
Of course it would be optimal for the buyer if it
could have "hair trigger" walk away
conditions. That would give the buyer
tremendous "optionality." But that's not the
real world.
Fred, Gar focused on the word "prospects"-a
forward looking term. But I note that there's
also other forward-looking language in your
definition. You define MAE to encompass
circumstances that could reasonably be
expected to "result in" a material adverse effect
in the future. Do you feel you may be going
too far in asking for these forward-looking
standards in the definition of material adverse
effect?
"Prospects" definitely is a hot button. It used
to be included pretty regularly in MAE
definitions, but M&A practitioners started
focusing on it as being too exacting of a
standard, and now it's routinely negotiated
out.84 However, for the buyer, the need to
protect against having to close the tender in the
face of clearly foreseeable adverse effects
remains important. Things can happen
between signing and closing that haven't had
negative consequences yet, but the
consequences may be just around the corner
and be predictable. For example, a law might
84. The MAE definition included "prospects" in only 1% of the deals surveyed for
the 2011 ABA Study, supra note 44.
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be amended, but the amendment is not yet
effective, and at a future time the change in law
is expected to adversely affect the target. So
yes, we'll agree to take out the word
"prospects," but we're going to make sure that
the language of the MAE definition has some
prospective element, so that we're protected in
the event some event has in fact occurred, but
the ramifications, which will be adverse and
material, haven't themselves yet materialized.
The biggest difference between the two
versions of the material adverse effect
definition is the lengthy carve-outs that Gar has
added to his target-favorable version. By
virtue of these carve-outs, certain things that
would normally constitute a material adverse
effect in terms of their effect on the target
company's business or operations are
specifically excluded from the definition. Is
what Gar has proposed here fair, Fred?
Yes and no. Carve-outs are de rigueur now.
It's just a question of how far they go. And
frankly the list of carve-outs you see is starting
to become almost identical from deal to deal.
There are some aspects of Gar's draft that I'm
going to resist. For example, while I may
agree that the buyer can't walk away because
of adverse effects arising from conditions
affecting the U.S. economy generally, I will
want to retain the right for the buyer to walk
away if those conditions have a
disproportionate effect on Gar's client.86
85. Carve-outs for general economic conditions, general conditions in the target's
industry and the announcement or pendency of the deal are present in at least 90% of the
transactions surveyed for the 2011 ABA Study. Id. For an example of a case in which a
carve-out in the definition of "material adverse effect" was central to the court's decision
as to whether the buyer could walk away, see Genesco, Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No.
07-2137-11(111), 2007 WL 4698244 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 27, 2007).
86. The "disproportionate effect" concept was present in 91% of those transactions
surveyed for the 2011 ABA Study that had a carve-out for general economic conditions.
Id.
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Gar has made a valiant effort on one or two
other carve-outs that I would resist--such as
the carve-out for legal, accounting, investment
banking and other fees. There are
representations that cover these costs. We
should discuss and agree on what these costs
are going to be. But if there's a gigantic
surprise as to the amount of these professional
fees that conceivably could rise to the level of
an MAE, that shouldn't be carved out.87
RICK CLIMAN: Gar, let me ask you about one other condition
(Moderator) here. What about the so-called "market-out" in
clause "(k)"? It's not unusual in my
experience to see this sort of condition in a
hostile tender offer.88 But does it belong in a
87. See generally Comment to Section 5.7 of the MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT,
supra note 11.
88. See, e.g., CKH Acquisition Corp. and Roche Holding Ltd Tender Offer
Statement (Schedule TO) (Jan. 27, 2012) (in respect of the proposed acquisition of
Illumina, Inc.) ("14(v) there occurs (a) any general suspension of trading in, or limitation
on prices for, securities on any national securities exchange or in the over-the-counter
market, (b) any decline in either the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard and
Poor's Index of 500 Industrial Companies or the NASDAQ-100 Index by an amount in
excess of 15%, measured from the business day immediately preceding the
commencement date of the Offer, (c) any change in the general political, market,
economic or financial conditions in the United States, the European-Union or elsewhere
that, in our reasonable judgment, could have a material adverse effect on the business,
financial condition or results of operations or prospects of Parent and its subsidiaries,
taken as a whole, or the Company and its subsidiaries, taken as a whole, (d) the
declaration of a banking moratorium or any suspension of payments in respect of banks
in the United States, the European Union, Switzerland or elsewhere, (e) the
nationalization, insolvency or placement into receivership of, or provision of
extraordinary assistance to, any major bank in the United States, European Union or
Switzerland, or the taking of possession of any such bank by a governmental or
regulatory authority, (f) the default by any member of the European Union in payment of,
or the inability of any such member to pay, any of its debts as they become due or the
withdrawal (or announcement of an intent to withdraw) by any member of the European
Monetary Union therefrom or any such member otherwise ceasing (or announcing its
intent to cease) to maintain the Euro as its official currency, (g) any material adverse
change (or development or threatened development involving a prospective material
adverse change) in U.S. dollar or Euro currency exchange rates (including a material
decline in the value of the Euro or dollar relative to any other currency) or the markets
therefor (including any suspension of, or limitation on, such markets), (h) any material
adverse change in the market price of the Shares or in the U.S. or European securities or
financial markets, (i) the commencement of a war, armed hostilities or other international
or national calamity directly or indirectly involving the United States or any attack on,
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negotiated, friendly tender offer like this one?
No. I think that would be considered just an
inadvertent holdover from a hostile deal. I




VII. DEFINITIVE ACQUISITION AGREEMENT-NON-RELIANCE
PROVISION
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator, in the role
of Counsel for Target)
Joel, let's assume you represent the buyer.
Putting on my target lawyer's hat, it appears
that you have left out a clause in the definitive
acquisition agreement that I would really like
to see in there. It's called a "non-reliance"
clause, and the language I'm looking for
appears [in Appendix N].
It says that your client, the buyer, understands
that my client, the target company, is not
making any representations to the buyer other
than the express representations in the
acquisition agreement, and that your client, the
buyer, isn't relying on any representations
outside the contract. That sounds like
unobjectionable boilerplate to me. I assume
this language shouldn't be controversial.
outbreak or act of terrorism involving the United States, (j) any limitation (whether or not
mandatory) by any governmental authority or agency on, or any other event or change
that, in our reasonable judgment, may adversely affect, the extension of credit by banks
or other financial institutions or the availability of financing or (k) in the case of any of
the foregoing existing at the time of the commencement of the Offer, a material
acceleration or worsening thereof.").
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Commentator, in the
role of Counsel for
Buyer)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator, in the role
of Counsel for Target)
You assume incorrectly. The problem with
your language is that, as you well know, in
getting to this definitive agreement we've had
all kinds of interaction with the target. This is
a friendly deal. You've made elaborate due
diligence presentations-not just informal
conversations, but scripted presentations.
You've given us an offering memorandum.
And we've looked at those things. If they were
totally irrelevant to our decision process we
wouldn't have bothered to attend the
presentations and read the documents.
Wait a second, Joel. If any information in
those presentations and materials was truly
central to your client's decision-making
process, you should have negotiated express
representations and warranties in the definitive
acquisition agreement about that information.
I'll tell you why I want this non-reliance
clause. There's some very powerful case law
out there-not only in the context of private
company transactions, but also in the public
company context-confirming that, at least in
some jurisdictions, the inclusion of this sort of
non-reliance clause will, in effect, immunize
the target company from certain types of fraud
claims. In particular, it will preclude your
client from successfully pursuing a fraud claim
based on some misstatement outside the four
corners of the acquisition agreement.
Among the cases you should look at are ABRY
Partners,89 Chancellor Strine's seminal opinion
89. ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1058 (Del.
Ch. 2006) ("To fail to enforce non-reliance clauses is not to promote a public policy
against lying. Rather, it is to excuse a lie made by one contracting party in writing-the
lie that it was relying only on contractual representations and that no other
representations had been made-to enable it to prove that another party lied orally or in a
writing outside the contract's four corners.").
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Commentator, in the
role of Counsel for
Buyer)
RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator, in the role
of Counsel for Target)
in Delaware in the private company context,
and the Genesco90 decision in Tennessee in the
public company context.91
I concede that a well-drafted non-reliance
clause may work as you've stated, and that's
exactly the result I don't want. It's one thing to
say you're not going to make a representation
that the projections your client gave us will be
achieved. But I think it's fair to say that I
should have some remedy if the way the
projections were created was your client's CFO
and a junior investment banker went into the
back room and said, "What sort of numbers do
we have to put down to attract the interest of
this buyer? Reality is not a concern. We're
going to make it up as we go along." If I can
prove that kind of fraudulent behavior actually
occurred, I don't see why I should have agreed
to a clause that will give your client an
argument that it's immune from a fraud claim.
Let me respond to that, Joel. If my client, the
target company, doesn't get this non-reliance
clause, and your client, the buyer, is
disappointed with the acquisition for any
reason before it closes, then your client will dig
into its copious due diligence files and will try
to find some piece of information that was
inaccurate. And then it will try to use that
allegedly inaccurate piece of information to try
to avoid closing the deal by asserting a
common law or securities fraud claim.
90. Genesco, No. 07-2137-11(111), 2007 WL 4698244.
91. There is a split in the circuits as to whether non-reliance clauses are effective to
bar an antifraud claim under the federal securities laws. Compare Harsco Corp. v. Segui,
91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996) (non-reliance clause effective), with AES Corp. v. Dow
Chemical Co., 325 F.3d (3d Cir. 2003) (non-reliance clause not effective as a matter of
law, but admissible as evidence on the issue of whether reliance was reasonable). See
generally Glenn D. West and W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid Extra-
Contractual Liability-Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the "Entire" Deal, 64
Bus. LAW. 999 (2009).
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Commentator, in the








There's a lot of informal and even loose talk in
the due diligence process. That's inevitable.
Again, if there's anything that you've
uncovered in due diligence that you feel is
absolutely key to your deal, then you should
enshrine it in an express representation in the
acquisition agreement.
I would remind you, Rick, that a fraud claim
isn't that simple to prove. To establish a fraud
claim based on a statement made in the due
diligence process, at a minimum I'm going to
have to show that it is actually false and made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth, and that I relied upon it.
If I can find a document meeting all those
standards, maybe I should be able to bring a
fraud claim.
Let's step out of character, Joel. Who typically
wins this fight? This is certainly an issue that's
gotten a lot more attention in the recent past,
perhaps because of these recent judicial
precedents. Who generally prevails?
As with everything else, it's chiefly a matter of
leverage. But I think if you look at the data
you're going to find that more agreements have
a non-reliance provision than don't, because,
despite the increased attention these provisions
have received, I'm not sure many buyers'
lawyers will focus on the fact that this type of
provision can cut off the ability to assert a
fraud claim as a defense to closing.
Right. Take a look at the 2011 ABA Strategic
Buyer/Public Target Mergers and Acquisitions
Deal Points Study92 if you'd like to see some
92. Only 14% of the agreements surveyed in the 2011 ABA Study, supra note 44,
included a non-reliance clause; however, approximately 56% contained a "no other
representations and warranties clause." The latter provision, though superficially similar,
cannot be relied on to have the same effect. But see Transched Sys. Ltd. v. Versyss
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JOEL GREENBERG:
(Commentator)
statistics from 2010 showing how frequently
you're seeing non-reliance clauses in public
company acquisition agreements. I think it's
fair to say that parties are more sensitive now
than they were a decade ago to the legal effect
of non-reliance clauses.
One last question on this, Joel. Let's assume
you win this negotiation, and the definitive
acquisition agreement does not include a non-
reliance clause. You still have to be careful,
don't you, because it's likely that your client
will have signed a confidentiality agreement
that contains non-reliance language? Most
confidentiality agreements I've seen that have
been prepared by target companies' lawyers
contain non-reliance language of some sort. I
assume you're going to want to make sure that
the non-reliance language in the confidentiality
agreement does not survive the signing of the
definitive acquisition agreement, right?
That's exactly right. And that's an issue
people don't focus on as much as they should.
There's all kinds of stuff that finds its way into
confidentiality agreements, particularly when
there's an auction going on and your client, as
a potential bidder, is really anxious to get its
hands on the due diligence data. You can't
always clean up all that stuff before the
confidentiality agreement gets signed. So
one thing to be very careful about, from a
buyer's perspective, is to say to the target,
"Look, we'll put a stand-alone disclosure
Transit Solutions, LLC, No. 07C-08-286 WCC, 2008 WL 948307, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct.
Apr. 2, 2008) ("While Plaintiff correctly points out that anti-reliance language must be
clear, nowhere in the cases Plaintiff cites have the Courts held that some form of the
word 'rely' must appear in the contract for it to be 'clear.' Indeed, the thrust of the
language . .. is unambiguous: no representations made outside of the four corners of the
Agreement are to be given consideration by the parties in interpreting the terms.
Consequently, Plaintiff cannot argue it justifiably relied on anything other than what is
present in the contract.").
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restriction in the definitive acquisition
agreement to protect your data in case we don't
close, but all this other stuff that was in the
confidentiality agreement we signed, that has
to fall away once we enter into a definitive
agreement."




Let's move now to another potentially
contentious area of negotiations, deal
protection provisions. These are the provisions
that are requested by the buyer to help keep
potential competing bidders at bay. There are a
host of provisions in the buyer's draft of the
acquisition documentation that can be
categorized as deal protections. Let's tick
through some of them now:
First, we have the target's no-shop/no-talk
covenant in Section 5.3(a) of the buyer's form
of definitive acquisition agreement; you'll see
an example [in Appendix JJ. This is a
provision that precludes the buyer from
soliciting competing acquisition proposals and,
subject to a fiduciary exception, prohibits the
buyer from even speaking with a bidder who
submits an unsolicited competing acquisition
proposal.
Second, we have the target's recommendation
covenant, in Section 1.2 of the buyer's form of
definitive acquisition agreement, [in Appendix
G]. This is the provision that requires the
93. See Amy Y. Yeung & Charles B. Vincent, Delaware's No-Go Treatment ofNo-
Talk Provisions: Deal-Protection Devices after Omnicare, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311
(2008); Karl F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513 (2003); Kimberly J.
Burgess, Note, Gaining Perspective: Directors' Duties in the Context of No-Shop and
No-Talk Provisions in Merger Agreements, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 431 (2001).
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target's board of directors to recommend, and
to continue recommending, the buyer's deal to
the target's stockholders, subject to an
important fiduciary exception.94
Third, we have the termination and break-up
fee provisions in section 8 of the definitive
acquisition agreement, appearing [in Appendix
L].95
The buyer might also seek to include in the
deal documentation even stronger protection,
in the form of support agreements pursuant to
which certain key stockholders of the target
agree to tender their shares in the buyer's
tender offer. These support agreements may
also contain other features, such as an option
granted to the buyer to purchase the shares of
the key stockholders at the tender offer price
under certain circumstances if a competing bid
is launched, or perhaps some sort of "profit
forfeiture" provision.9 6
There are other deal protections found in public
94. See MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 169-89; see also Committee
on Corporate Laws, Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act-Proposed Force the Vote Amendments to Chapter 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and
14, 63 Bus. LAW. 511 (2007-2008); David B. Chubak, Locking in the Lock-Up-Orman
v. Cullman & Corporate Deal Protection Measures, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 457 (2004-
2005); Jay H. Knight, Merger Agreements Post-Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.:
How the Delaware Supreme Court Pulled the Plug on Mathematical Lock-ups, 31 N. KY.
L. REv. 29 (2004); John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model ofLockups:
Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REv. 307 (2000).
95. See MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 276-93; see also Sean J.
Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1899 (2002-2003); Leo E. Jr. Strine, Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures
in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. LAW. 919 (2000-2001); Paul L. Regan,
Great Expectations-A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21
CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1999-2000); Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process
Based Model for Analyzing Deal Protection Measures, 55 Bus. LAW. 1609 (1999-2000).
96. See MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 401-15; see also Brian JM
Quinn, Bulletproof Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865 (2006-
2007).
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company deals, including so-called "match
rights."97
All of these various deal protections are
obviously interrelated, and the target's board of
directors has to evaluate the proposed deal
protection measures together as a collective
package.
If the target's directors allow the buyer to
obtain deal protections that are too buyer-
favorable-that are "preclusive" or "coercive"
in the words of the Delaware courts-4hen
these directors risk being found to have
breached their fiduciary duties. Lisa, as the
Delaware practitioner on the panel, would you
care to elaborate?
LISA SCHMIDT: Sure. The courts in Delaware are going to look
(Delaware Counsel) at the entire package of deal protections,98 so
the parties have to strike the right balance in
negotiating them. Typically, Delaware courts
won't "blue pencil" overly protective deal
protections. They're going to look at the whole
package, and you risk your entire transaction if
the court feels it's too aggressive. 99 The most
97. See MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 271-73; see also Guhan
Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and
Implications, 63 Bus. LAW. 729 (2007-2008).
98. In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2011 WL 1366780, at *4
(Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) ("The measure of a deal protection strategy, of course, is the
cumulative effect."); see also La. Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918
A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("[A] court focuses upon 'the real world risks and
prospects confronting (directors] when they agreed to the deal protections.' That analysis
will, by necessity, require the Court to consider a number of factors . .. and the
preclusive or coercive power of all deal protections included in a transaction, taken as a
whole.").
99. In Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995), the
Delaware Supreme Court held that:
In assessing a challenge to defensive actions by a target corporation's board of
directors . .. this Court has held that the Court of Chancery should evaluate the
board's overall response, including the justification for each contested
defensive measure, and the results achieved thereby. Where all of the target
board's defensive actions are inextricably related, the principles of Unocal
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So as we negotiate these deal protections we
have to be very mindful of the fact that the
Delaware judges are, in effect, looking over the
parties' shoulders. Fred, as counsel for the
buyer, as much as you'd like to get away with
extremely protective deal protections, you also
have an interest in making sure the deal
protections aren't too aggressive, right?
Yes, absolutely. I'm hoping this transaction is
going to close and my client will wind up
owning the target. To the extent there's
litigation, which you plan for and frankly
expect in just about every public M&A
transaction, my client's going to inherit the
need to defend that litigation. So the buyer
will have a keen interest in having strong deal
protection measures in place, and may seek to
push close to the line of what is perceived to be
permitted as a legal matter, but not beyond.
We generally want to negotiate provisions that
make it very difficult for an interloper to get
into the mix, without making it impossible.
Similarly, we realize that we cannot negotiate
require that such actions be scrutinized collectively as a unitary response to the
perceived threat.
Id. at 1386-87 (citing Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. Super. Ct.
1990)); see also In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1022-23 n.80
(Del. Ch. 2005) (suggesting that the Court of Chancery should consider enjoining a
merger's closing preliminarily rather than "blue pencil" deal protections). But see Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Categorical Conffusion: Deal Protection Measures In Stock-for-Stock Merger
Agreements, 56 Bus. LAW. 919, 941 n.71 (2001) (suggesting that some circumstances
might justify judicial "blue penciling" of deal protections).
100. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). In
Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a combination of deal protections that
effectively "locks-up" a merger, in the sense of rendering it a "fait accompli" prior to
formal stockholder approval, is invalid on the basis that it prevents the board from
exercising its continuing fiduciary responsibilities. Id. at 936. The merger agreement at
issue in Omnicare made it "mathematically impossible" and "realistically unattainable"
for a potential third party bidder to complete a transaction with the company (no matter
how superior the proposal) because it included a "force-the-vote" provision, voting
agreements locking up in excess of 50% of the voting power and did not include a
"fiduciary out" provision. Id.
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for mechanisms that have a coercive effect on
the target's stockholders.
RICK CLIMAN: We're short on time, so we won't be able to
(Moderator) address this topic in depth. I would urge those
of you who have an interest in this topic to
look at the extensive literature on deal
protection measures. 01
We're going to conclude the deal protection
segment of our presentation with a brief
discussion regarding the size of break-up fees.
Lisa, let's assume a relatively standard break-
up fee configuration in which the target
company is required to pay the buyer a break-
up fee if (1) the buyer terminates the
acquisition agreement after the target's board
"changes horses," if you will-after the
target's board withdraws its recommendation
that the target's stockholders tender their
shares to the buyer--or (2) if the target
company terminates the acquisition agreement
in order to accept a better offer. Can we
assume that a break-up fee of, say, 20% of deal
value, just to take a very extreme example, is
going to be excessive? How does that analysis
work? Why is a 20% break-up fee considered
impermissibly preclusive in a context like this?
LISA SCHMIDT: Well, a Delaware court is going to apply a
(Delaware Counsel) Unocal'02 analysis and determine whether this
101. Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP.
L. 865 (2007); Justin W. Oravetz, Is a Merger Agreement Ever Certain? The Impact of
the Omnicare Decision on Deal Protection Devices, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 805 (2004); John
C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of Lockups: Theory and
Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REv. 307 (2000).
102. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The two-
pronged Unocal test provides that defensive measures are permissible if (i) reasonable
grounds to believe that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness exist and (ii) the
defensive measure adopted is reasonable in relation to the perceived threat. Id. at 955-56.
Directors satisfy their burden under the first prong of Unocal by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation of the threat. Id. at 955. The second prong of the Unocal test
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defensive measure precludes a topping bid.
Adding 20% on to the top of a transaction is
something that I don't think any of our judges
would have trouble quickly finding preclusive.
Now, when you talk about "adding 20%" to the
transaction, we have to keep in mind that this is
a break-up fee that's payable by the target
company, not directly by an interloper. But it
is the interloper-the competing bidder-that
actually bears the fee, because that competing
bidder is going to end up buying a target
company whose cash resources have been
depleted by the amount of the fee; and that will
have the effect of lowering the price it's
willing to pay for the target. This is what's
going to preclude other bidders from putting a
competitive price on the table, and that's why
courts are so suspicious of large break-up fees,
right?
That's exactly right.
So given that, Fred, how big a break-up fee
would you be asking for in the definitive
agreement? Let's assume here that we're
dealing with a target company that's valued at
$1 billion based on your client's cash offer
price.
This is not a purely formulaic exercise. There
is touch and feel involved, and as you and Lisa
have said, you have to look at the break-up fee
in combination with the rest of the deal
protection measures. A rule of thumb is 2.5%
to 4% of equity value, with the percentage
(i.e., the reasonableness of the defensive measure), in turn, is determined through a two-
step analysis as articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unitrin. 651 A.2d at
1386-88. That analysis requires that the defensive measure adopted (i) must not be either
"coercive or preclusive" and (ii) must fall within a "range of reasonable responses" to the
threat posed. Id. at 1367.
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declining slightly as the deals get larger. Here
we've posited a deal value of a billion dollars,
and I might ask for 3% or 3.5%, or possibly
even 4%, of equity value, expecting that there
is going to be give and take and wanting the
record to show there's been real negotiation on
the point. I'd probably hope to settle
somewhere around 3%, but there truly is not a
"one size fits all" approach to this.
I think there is an element of Kabuki Theater to
this. I don't necessarily agree that the
acceptable range is 2.5% to 4%. On the target
side I would characterize the appropriate range
as 2.5% to 3.5%. And the scatter pattern for
larger deals starts to taper off after you get up
to around 3%, I'd say.
But isn't part of the issue that you have to look
at this not only in the context of the other deal
protection measures you've negotiated, but
also in the context of how actively this target
company has been shopped? Presumably, the
buyer should be able to justify a materially
higher break-up fee if the target has been
shopped than if it hasn't. But while you will
know, Gar, whether the target has been
shopped, Fred really isn't going to know that,
because you're not going to share that
information with him in the deal negotiations.
It's also very much a function of the directors'
reaction to how good the price is. The more
excited the target is about the price, the further
the target ought to be willing to stretch in terms
of the size of the break-up fee.
But basically, Gar, you're saying that a break-
up fee in the range of $25 million to $35
million in this context-2.5% to 3.5% of the $1
billion total deal value-wouldn't necessarily
offend you, right?
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That's right. Although I think I did say I
thought the scatter pattern would be closer to
2.5% to 3%. But you do see 3.5%. I just think
you see it a little bit less frequently.
I take it, Lisa, that a 2.5% to 3.5% break-up fee
wouldn't offend you either.
No, not at all.
Now let me add a potentially important fact to
the mix. Would your view of the appropriate
size of the break-up fee change if, even though
this target is valued at $1 billion, its assets
include a huge chunk of cash-say $400
million in freely available cash? Let's assume
that the target has little or no debt, so that the
net cost to the buyer--the enterprise value as
distinct from the equity value of the target
company-is in the range of $600 million,
even though the target's outstanding stock has
a market value of $1 billion. 103 So the $35
million break-up fee represents close to 6% of
the target's enterprise value. Are you going to
be uncomfortable with a number that high,
Lisa?
No, because I think a Delaware court is still
going to look at the fee as a percentage of
equity value, not enterprise value, and the fee
103. "Equity value" is generally defined as the cost necessary to purchase the equity
of a company in the market, while "enterprise value" is the equity value plus the cost of
acquiring the target's debt, minus cash and cash equivalents on the company's balance
sheet. See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 502 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Arguably, enterprise value offers a more accurate picture of the aggregate consideration
required by an acquirer to purchase the target at the end of the day (because, for example,
a potential topping bidder would also have to take into account the cost of acquiring the
target's debt, or on the flip side, the buyer could conceivably use the target's significant
cash reserves to offset the cost of the bid), but as the Court of Chancery noted in Cogent,
the fact that a company has no debt and a sizeable part of its "assets are especially liquid,
like cash, does not change the fact that a buyer still must come up with the cash to
purchase it, even if the buyer may be able to obtain very favorable financing (by using
the cash of the target as security)." Id. at 504.
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represents only 3.5% of the target's equity
value.
So you would conclude that equity value,
rather than enterprise value, is the right metric
in this context. What do you base that on?
There was a trend of arguing that you should
look at enterprise value after some comments
that Chancellor Strine made in Lear,10 4 where
he observed that, in a highly leveraged
transaction, maybe you should look at
enterprise value. But, since then, in cases
where there was a substantial amount of cash
on the target's balance sheet, the courts have
consistently looked at equity value, not
enterprise value. 05
Of course, the facts are never quite as simple as
those we have been discussing. We're talking
about a target company with a lot of cash on its
balance sheet, yet in the case of most large
U.S. companies a good part of that is probably
parked overseas and requires a significant tax
cost to get it back to the U.S.
Conversely, if you were making an acquisition
of a large investment bank, which typically
runs at 40-to-one or 50-to-one leverage,
nobody is going to suggest that you could ask
for a break-up fee of 100% of equity value on
the theory that it's only 2% of enterprise value.
I would like the strike suit lawyers' chances in
104. In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 120 (Del. Ch. 2007).
105. See, e.g., In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL
1938253, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011) ("Delaware's case law ... teaches that such
termination fees are generally measured according to a Company's equity value."); In re
Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2011 WL 1366780, at *4 n.52 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 11, 2011) ("Our law has evolved by relating the break-up fee to equity value. The
Plaintiffs have offered no compelling reason for deviating from that approach."); In re
Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487 (Del. Ch. 2010) (measuring termination fee by
transaction's equity value and noting that the reasonableness of such a fee "depends on
the particular facts surrounding the transaction").
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So let me put a similar hypothetical to Lisa by
changing the facts. Suppose this target
company, that has shares valued at $1 billion,
has $3 billion in debt and very little cash. So
while its equity value is only $1 billion, its
enterprise value is $4 billion. Could we
increase the break-up fee to, say, $100 million?
That's only 2.5% of enterprise value-but it is
a whopping 10% of equity value. What about
that footnote in Lear that you alluded to earlier,
Lisa?
This is a closer call because there is the
comment in Lear, but I don't know that a court
is going to endorse a fee that's 10% of equity
value, regardless of the fact that it's only 2.5%
of enterprise value. In Lear you had 3.5%
versus 2.4%. So the relevant percentages there
were much closer. Ten percent, I think, is
going to be tough for a court to swallow.
Does anyone on the panel think that the answer
might turn in part on whether that debt has to
be refinanced in the context of the transaction?
If the $3 billion in debt becomes due and has to
be replaced immediately as a result of the
buyer's acquisition of the target, might a court
be more inclined to endorse a larger break-up
fee?
Logically maybe it should, but I think this is an
area the courts are very reluctant to get into.
You're going to have all kinds of variations as
to what kind of debt you're talking about.
Take a company that leverages itself on an
extreme basis in the commercial paper market.
That company is refinancing its debt all the
time. But you wouldn't really think that should
justify a break-up fee that's 30% or 40% of
equity value.
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FRED GREEN
(Counsel for Buyer):
What's happened since the Lear footnote,
though, is practitioners have begun to focus a
good deal more on the issue of equity value vs.
enterprise value for this purpose, and some
publications now track both percentages in
reporting on the break-up fee in every deal.
The awareness level has changed and that leads
to debate, and perhaps future flexibility in










Let's spend the final ten minutes of our
presentation talking about some of the
provisions of the acquisition agreement that
bear on antitrust risks.
MJ, let's assume that the buyer and the target
company are fierce competitors, and you're the
target company's antitrust lawyer. Let's also
assume you've tentatively concluded, as a
result of significant overlaps between the
buyer's products and the target company's
products, that there is a significant risk that the
contemplated acquisition of the target by the
buyer is going to be challenged by the antitrust
authorities, perhaps both here in the U.S. and
abroad. As the target company's antitrust
lawyer, what's the most aggressive thing you
might ask for initially in order to address the
risk to the target that the inevitable antitrust
challenge will kill the deal?
My opening bid is certainly going to be to ask
for a "hell-or-high-water" clause.
What's a hell-or-high-water clause?
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MJ MOLTENBREY: A hell-or-high-water clause would require the
(Antitrust Counsel buyer to do anything and everything demanded
for Target) by the antitrust authorities in order to satisfy
the antitrust regulatory conditions to the
closing of the deal. That would include
product divestitures of any size, agreements
imposing limitations on the buyer's future
conduct and agreements to license
products-whatever it takes to get antitrust
clearance, including vigorously litigating the
challenge by the authorities. 06
106. For an example of a hell-or-high-water provision, see section 5.4(d) of the
Agreement and Plan of Merger among Kinder Morgan, Inc., Sherpa Merger Sub, Inc.,
Sherpa Acquisition, LLC, Sirius Holdings Merger Corporation, Sirius Merger
Corporation, and El Paso Corporation, which provides in part:
Parent (including by its Subsidiaries) agrees to take, or cause to be taken
(including by its Subsidiaries), any and all steps and to make, or cause to be
made (including by its Subsidiaries), any and all undertakings necessary to
resolve such objections, if any, that a Governmental Authority may assert under
any Antitrust Law with respect to the Transactions, and to avoid or eliminate
each and every impediment under any Antitrust Law that may be asserted by
any Governmental Authority with respect to the Transactions, in each case, so
as to enable the Closing to occur as promptly as practicable and in any event no
later than the Extended Walk-Away Date, including, without limitation,
(x) proposing, negotiating, committing to and effecting, by consent decree, hold
separate order, or otherwise, the sale, divestiture or disposition of any
businesses, assets, equity interests, product lines or properties of Parent or the
Company (or any of their respective Subsidiaries) or any equity interest in any
joint venture held by Parent or the Company (or any of their respective
Subsidiaries), (y) creating, terminating, or divesting relationships, ventures,
contractual rights or obligations of the Company or Parent or their respective
Subsidiaries and (z) otherwise taking or committing to take any action that
would limit Parent's freedom of action with respect to, or its ability to retain or
hold, directly or indirectly, any businesses, assets, equity interests, product
lines or properties of Parent or the Company (including any of their respective
Subsidiaries) or any equity interest in any joint venture held by Parent or the
Company (or any of their respective Subsidiaries), in each case as may be
required in order to obtain all approvals, consents, clearances, expirations or
terminations of waiting periods, registrations, permits, authorizations and other
confirmations required directly or indirectly under any Antitrust Law or to
avoid the commencement of any action to prohibit the Transactions under any
Antitrust Law, or, in the alternative, to avoid the entry of, or to effect the
dissolution of, any injunction, temporary restraining order or other order in any
action or proceeding seeking to prohibit the Transactions or delay the Closing
beyond the Extended Walk-Away Date.
Kinder Morgan, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger dated as of October 16, 2011 among
Kinder Morgan, Inc., Sherpa Merger Sub, Inc., Sherpa Acquisition, LLC, Sirius Holdings
Merger Corp. Sirius Merger Corp. and El Paso Corp. (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1) § 5.4(d) (Oct.
19, 2011).
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Aggressively litigating the matter right until
the drop-dead date, and then divesting anything
and everything that it takes to get the antitrust
authorities to bless the deal.
But aren't there situations where the
government just says no, there is nothing
curative you can do, we will oppose this?
Yes. But a true hell-or-high-water clause
would call for the buyer to pay the full
purchase price whether or not the buyer can
actually close the acquisition. Now, I don't
think you're going to see that very often, but
conceptually ...
But you do occasionally see it. I was involved
in a private deal where the purchase price was
secured by a letter of credit that the sellers
could draw on if the buyer couldn't obtain
antitrust clearance.1 07
You see hell-or-high-water provisions being
requested by a target when a bidder who is a
competitor of the target puts a compelling price
on the table, which it is able to do because of
the synergies that can be realized. The target
may resist doing the deal with this bidder
because of the antitrust risk, and the bidder will
have to search for a means of reassuring the
target that it is worth accepting the offer.
The solution in that scenario could be that the
bidder offers to "take the antitrust risk." That
way, the target can compare the bidder's offer
with offers made by other potential buyers who
107. See Stock Purchase Agreement dated April 12, 1984, among Condec Corp.,
Norman I. Schafler, Rubelle Schafler, R. Scott Schafler, Julie Schafler Dale, Gerald
Rosenberg, Richard M. Cion, Condec Acquisition Corp., William F. Farley, Farley
Acquisition Corporation, Farley Metals, Inc., and Farley Industries, Inc. filed as Exhibit
Q to Amendment No. 12 to Schedule 13D of William F. Farley (Apr. 17, 1984) (in
respect to the Common Stock of Condec Corporation).
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aren't competitors. The bidder essentially
agrees to close the deal "come hell or high
water"-even if it has to divest its own assets,
or divest some of the assets it would otherwise
be acquiring in the deal, or has to give a proxy
to a third party or enter into a "hold separate
agreement" that separates the offending assets
and allows the parties to close the transaction.
Let's assume that in this deal, as is likely to be
the case, the buyer gets heartburn over a true
hell-or-high-water clause. You do see hell-or-
high-water clauses, but they are exceedingly
rare. MJ, as the target's antitrust counsel,
might you request something less extreme than
a hell-or-high-water clause?
I would ask for a "best efforts" clause,
requiring the buyer to use its best efforts108 to
get the needed antitrust clearances. I probably
would want to specify that best efforts would
include divestitures ...
Divestitures of specific assets that are actually
identified, or divestitures of unspecified assets
up to a certain dollar amount?
You could do it either way. It could be
divestitures up to a particular dollar value, but
oftentimes you do see very specific assets
identified. Obviously, the concerns with
identifying specific mandatory asset
divestitures in your acquisition agreement is
that you are providing a roadmap to the
regulators in terms of what they should demand
from the buyer. So sometimes the buyer might
prefer not to specify exactly what assets are to
be divested and would prefer to simply say that
108. The meaning of an obligation to use "best efforts" is not clearly established. See
MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 124-26; Zachary Miller, Note, Best
Efforts?: Differing Judicial Interpretations of a Familiar Term, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 615
(2006).
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it will be required to divest assets generating
up to a specified dollar amount of annual
revenues.1 0 9
Right. Would you also specify that "best
efforts" includes vigorously litigating any
governmental litigation challenges to the
transaction?
Yes.
Where do reverse break-up fees fit into this?
We see deals with reverse break-up fee
provisions that say that if the deal falls apart,
and the reason it falls apart is an antitrust
challenge, then the buyer will pay the target
company a reverse break-up fee of a specified
dollar amount.
It's called a reverse break-up fee because,
unlike the break-up fees we talked about
earlier, which are paid by the target to the
buyer in the deal protection context, the buyer
pays the target an antitrust-related break-up
fee. It goes in the opposite direction.
MJ, are reverse break-up fees an effective way
to address and allocate antitrust risk? And
when you have a reverse break-up fee, is it
layered on top of a best efforts-type provision,
or is it a substitute for that type of efforts
clause?
109. Compare, e.g., United Technologies Corp., Agreement And Plan Of Merger by
and among United Technologies Corp., Charlotte Lucas Corp. and Goodrich Corp., dated
as of September 21, 2011 (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1), at 38 (Sept. 23, 2011) (limiting United
Technologies' divestiture commitments to business, product lines or asset generating
revenues in excess of $900 million), with Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Agreement
And Plan Of Merger by and among Bloomberg Inc., Brass Acquisition Corp., and The
Bureau Of National Affairs, Inc. dated August 24, 2011 (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1), at 46-47
(Aug. 30, 2011) (limiting Bloomberg's divestiture obligations to its legal publication
assets and businesses).
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Most of the time there is going to be some type
of efforts clause in the deal-perhaps a
reasonable best efforts clause-along with the
reverse break-up fee. But if the reverse break-
up fee is high enough, it is conceivable that it
would be the only provision you would have.
The reverse break-up fee can serve a couple of
functions. One of them is to give the buyer
every incentive it needs to get the deal done,
and to do what it takes to get the antitrust
clearances it needs. But it also serves a
separate function, which is to compensate the
target for disruption to its business while the
deal is pending and while antitrust review is
going on. During that time the target is likely
at risk of losing employees and potentially
losing customers, and its business plans and
strategic plans are put on hold. Part of the idea
of the reverse break-up fee is to compensate
the target for that in the event the deal is
ultimately blocked.
MJ, in the deal protection context, Gar, Fred,
and Lisa said they would be comfortable with a
3% break-up fee, but that a fee significantly
higher than that could create fiduciary
issues." 0 Is there some limit on how high an
antitrust-related reverse break-up fee can be?
No. There's really no limit on what you might
see, and in fact we have many examples of
reverse break-up fees much greater than 3%. "'
110. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text
111. Examples of deals involving reverse break-up fees significantly greater than
three percent of the transaction value include Grifols SA's acquisition of Talecris
Biotherapeutics (9.4%), Talecris Biotherapeutics Holdings Corp., Agreement and Plan of
Merger (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1), at 92 (June 6, 2010); Seagate's acquisition of Maxtor
(15.8%), Seagate Technology PLC, Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among
Seagate Technology, MD Merger Corp. and Maxtor Corp., dated as of December 20,
2005 (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1), at 39 (Dec. 22, 2005); and Monsanto's acquisition of Delta
and Pine Land (40%), Monsanto Co., Agreement And Plan Of Merger dated as of August
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Didn't Google just offer up a 20% reverse
break-up fee in its pending acquisition of
Motorola Mobility? 1 l2  I take it that's an
outlier ...
It's pretty unusual.
Isn't it fair to say that most antitrust-related
reverse break-up fees fall in the range of 2% to
10% of deal value?
Yes.
Because of our time constraints, we've only
been able to scratch the surface. We haven't
been able to cover anywhere near the full range
of issues that the parties confront in the
negotiated acquisition of a publicly traded
company by way of a friendly tender offer.
Thanks for your attention.
14, 2006 by and among Monsanto Co., Monsanto Sub, Inc. and Delta & Pine Land Co.
(Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1) § 7.07(f) (Aug. 18, 2006).
112. Google, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1) (Aug. 15,
2011); see also Steven M. Davidoff, Behind Google's Huge Breakup Fee in Motorola
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2011, 4:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/
behind-googles-huge-breakup-fee-in-motorola-deal/.
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APPENDIX A
EXCERPTS FROM TARGET COMPANY'S
FORM OF CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
(INCLUDING "STANDSTILL" PRO VISION)
2. LIMITATION ON USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. The
Prospective Acquirer agrees that neither the Prospective Acquirer nor
any of its Representatives will use any Confidential Information in any
manner except for the specific purpose of pursuing a negotiated
acquisition of Target.
8. STANDSTILL PROVISION. The Prospective Acquirer agrees that,
during the three-year period commencing on the date of this Agreement
(the "Standstill Period"), neither the Prospective Acquirer nor any of the
Prospective Acquirer's Representatives will, in any manner, directly or
indirectly:
(a) make, effect, initiate, cause or participate in (i) any
acquisition of beneficial ownership of any securities of
Target or any securities of any subsidiary or other affiliate
of Target, (ii) any acquisition of any assets of Target or any
assets of any subsidiary or other affiliate of Target, (iii) any
tender offer, exchange offer, merger, business combination,
recapitalization, reorganization, restructuring, liquidation,
dissolution or extraordinary transaction involving Target or
any subsidiary or other affiliate of Target, or involving any
securities or assets of Target or any securities or assets of
any subsidiary or other affiliate of Target, or (iv) any
"solicitation" of "proxies" (as those terms are used in the
proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission) or
consents with respect to any securities of Target;
(b) form, join or participate in a "group" (as defined in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated
thereunder) with respect to the beneficial ownership of any
securities of Target;
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(c) act, alone or in concert with others, to seek to control or
influence the management, board of directors or policies of
Target;
(d) take any action that could reasonably be expected to require
Target to make a public announcement regarding any of the
types of matters set forth in clause "(a)" of this sentence;
(e) agree or offer to take, or encourage, facilitate or propose
(publicly or otherwise) the taking of, any action referred to
in clause "(a)," "(b)," "(c)" or "(d)" of this sentence;
(f induce or encourage any other Person to take any action of
the type referred to in clause "(a)," "(b)," "(c)," "(d)" or
"(e)" of this sentence;
(g) enter into any discussions, negotiations, arrangement or
agreement with any other Person relating to any of the
foregoing; or
(h) request or propose that Target or any of Target's
Representatives amend, waive or consider the amendment
or waiver of any provision set forth in this Section 8.
The expiration of the Standstill Period will not terminate or otherwise
affect any of the other provisions of this Agreement.
For purposes of this Agreement, a party's "Representatives" will be
deemed to include each Person that is or becomes (i) a subsidiary or
other affiliate of such party, or (ii) an officer, director, employee, partner,
attorney, advisor, accountant, agent or representative of such party or of
any of such party's subsidiaries or other affiliates.
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE RESPONSE BYPROSPECTIVE ACQUIRER TO
"STANDSTILL" PROVISION PROPOSED BY TARGET COMPANY
* Shorten duration of "Standstill Period" to 180 days
* Delete references to "affiliate" of Target
* Replace "Representatives" with "subsidiaries"
* Add the following "fall-away" provision:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
Agreement, if, at any time during the Standstill Period, any Person
(other than the Prospective Acquirer) or group of Persons
(i) commences, or announces an intention to commence, a tender or
exchange offer for at least 15% of any class of Target's securities,
(ii) commences, or announces an intention to commence, a proxy
contest or a solicitation of consents with respect to the election of
any director or directors of Target, (iii) acquires beneficial
ownership of at least 15% of any class of Target's securities, or
(iv) enters into, or announces an intention to enter into, an
agreement with Target contemplating the acquisition (by way of
merger, tender offer or otherwise) of at least 15% of any class of
Target's securities or all or a substantial portion of the assets of
Target or any of Target's subsidiaries, then (in any of such cases)
the restrictions set forth in this Section 8 shall immediately
terminate and cease to be of any further force or effect."
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[Target Co.] ("Target") has advised [Prospective Acquirer Co.] (the
"Prospective Acquirer") that Target wishes to engage in negotiations
with the Prospective Acquirer regarding a possible transaction involving
the Prospective Acquirer and Target (a "Possible Transaction"). In order
to induce the Prospective Acquirer to enter into negotiations with Target
regarding a Possible Transaction (and in recognition of the time and
effort that the Prospective Acquirer may expend and the expenses that
the Prospective Acquirer may incur in pursuing these negotiations and in
investigating Target's business), Target, intending to be legally bound,
agrees as follows:
1. Target acknowledges and agrees that, until the earlier of
, 20 or the date on which the Prospective Acquirer advises
Target in writing that the Prospective Acquirer is terminating all
negotiations regarding a Possible Transaction, Target will not do, and
will ensure that none of its Representatives (as defined in paragraph 7 of
this letter agreement) does, any of the following, directly or indirectly:
(a) solicit, or encourage or facilitate the initiation or submission
of, any expression of interest, inquiry, proposal or offer
from any person or entity (other than the Prospective
Acquirer) relating to a possible Acquisition Transaction (as
defined in paragraph 7 of this letter agreement);
(b) participate in any discussions or negotiations or enter into
any agreement with, or provide any nonpublic information
to, any person or entity (other than the Prospective
Acquirer) relating to or in connection with a possible
Acquisition Transaction; or
(c) entertain, consider or accept any proposal or offer from any
person or entity (other than the Prospective Acquirer)
relating to a possible Acquisition Transaction.
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Target shall, and shall cause each of its Representatives to, immediately
discontinue any ongoing discussions or negotiations (other than any
ongoing discussions with the Prospective Acquirer) relating to a possible
Acquisition Transaction, and shall promptly provide the Prospective
Acquirer with (i) an oral and a written description of any expression of
interest, inquiry, proposal or offer relating to a possible Acquisition
Transaction that is received by Target or by any of Target's
Representatives from any person or entity (other than the Prospective
Acquirer) on or prior to , 20 _, including in such description
the identity of the person or entity from which such expression of
interest, inquiry, proposal or offer was received (the "Other Interested
Party") and (ii) a copy of each written communication and a complete
summary of each other communication transmitted on behalf of the
Other Interested Party or any of the Other Interested Party's
Representatives to Target or any of Target's Representatives or
transmitted on behalf of Target or any of Target's Representatives to the
Other Interested Party or any of the Other Interested Party's
Representatives.
2. Target acknowledges and agrees that neither this letter
agreement nor any action taken in connection with this letter agreement
will give rise to any obligation on the part of the Prospective Acquirer
(a) to continue any discussions or negotiations with Target or (b) to
pursue or enter into any transaction or relationship of any nature with
Target.
3. Target shall not make or permit any disclosure to any person or
entity regarding (a) the existence or terms of this letter agreement, (b) the
existence of discussions or negotiations between Target and the
Prospective Acquirer or (c) the existence or terms of any proposal
regarding a Possible Transaction.
4. Target represents and warrants that neither the commencement
nor the continuation of any discussions or negotiations with the
Prospective Acquirer has resulted or will result in, and that neither the
execution and delivery nor the performance of this letter agreement has
resulted or will result in, (a) any breach of any agreement or obligation
by which Target or any of Target's Representatives is bound, or (b) any
violation of any law or regulation applicable to Target or any of Target's
Representatives. Target will indemnify and hold harmless the
Prospective Purchaser and the Prospective Purchaser's Representatives
against and from any claims, demands, liabilities, losses, damages or
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expenses arising directly or indirectly from or relating directly or
indirectly to any breach of any of Target's representations, warranties,
covenants or obligations set forth in this letter agreement.
5. Target acknowledges and agrees that, in addition to all other
remedies available (at law or otherwise) to the Prospective Acquirer, the
Prospective Acquirer shall be entitled to equitable relief (including
injunction and specific performance) as a remedy for any breach or
threatened breach of any provision of this letter agreement. Target
further acknowledges and agrees that the Prospective Acquirer shall not
be required to obtain, furnish or post any bond or similar instrument in
connection with or as a condition to obtaining any remedy referred to in
this paragraph 5, and Target waives any right it may have to require that
the Prospective Acquirer obtain, furnish or post any such bond or similar
instrument. If any action, suit or proceeding relating to this letter
agreement or the enforcement of any provision of this letter agreement is
brought against either party hereto, the prevailing party shall be entitled
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements (in
addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be
entitled).
6. This letter agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of (without giving
effect to principles of conflicts of laws). Target: (a) irrevocably and
unconditionally consents and submits to the jurisdiction of the state and
federal courts located in the State of for purposes of any
action, suit or proceeding arising out of or relating to this letter
agreement; (b) irrevocably and unconditionally waives any objection to
the laying of venue of any action, suit or proceeding arising out of or
relating to this letter agreement in any state or federal court located in the
State of ; and (c) irrevocably and unconditionally waives the
right to plead or claim, and irrevocably and unconditionally agrees not to
plead or claim, that any action, suit or proceeding arising out of or
relating to this letter agreement that is brought in any state or federal
court located in the State of has been brought in an
inconvenient forum.
7. For purposes of this letter agreement:
(a) Target's "Representatives" shall include each person or
entity that is or becomes (i) a subsidiary or other affiliate of
Target or (ii) an officer, director, employee, partner,
attorney, advisor, accountant, agent or representative of
Target or of any of Target's subsidiaries or other affiliates.
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(b) "Acquisition Transaction" shall mean any transaction
directly or indirectly involving:
(i) the sale, license, disposition or acquisition of all or a
material portion of the business or assets of Target or
any direct or indirect subsidiary or division of Target;
(ii) the issuance, grant, disposition or acquisition of
(A) any capital stock or other equity security of Target
or any direct or indirect subsidiary of Target, (B) any
option, call, warrant or right (whether or not
immediately exercisable) to acquire any capital stock
or other equity security of Target or any direct or
indirect subsidiary of Target, or (C) any security,
instrument or obligation that is or may become
convertible into or exchangeable for any capital stock
or other equity security of Target or any direct or
indirect subsidiary of Target; or
(iii) any merger, consolidation, business combination,
share exchange, recapitalization, reorganization or
similar transaction involving Target or any direct or
indirect subsidiary of Target;
provided, however, that (A) the grant of stock options by Target to its
employees in the ordinary course of business will not be deemed to be an
"Acquisition Transaction" if such grant is made pursuant to Target's
existing stock option plan and is consistent with Target's past practices,
and (B) the issuance of stock by Target to its employees upon the valid
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[Prospective Acquirer Co.] (the "Prospective Acquirer") and
[Target Co.] ("Target") contemplate engaging in negotiations regarding
the possible purchase by the Prospective Acquirer of all or substantially
all of the stock or assets of Target (the "Possible Transaction"). In
anticipation of these negotiations, the Prospective Acquirer and Target
(collectively, the "Parties") agree as follows:
1. Subject to the other provisions contained in this letter agreement,
during the Exclusivity Period (as defined in paragraph 6 of this letter
agreement), Target will not permit any of its directors or officers who
know about the Possible Transaction to solicit offers from, or to engage
in substantive negotiations with, any third party (other than the
Prospective Acquirer and its affiliates, representatives and advisors)
contemplating the purchase by such third party of all or substantially all
of the stock or assets of Target; provided, however, that notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in this letter agreement or in the
Confidentiality Agreement (as defined in paragraph 6 of this letter
agreement), it will not be a breach of this letter agreement or the
Confidentiality Agreement for Target or any of its directors, officers,
representatives, advisors, affiliates, employees or agents (i) to take or
permit the taking of any action otherwise prohibited by this letter
agreement if Target's board of directors determines in good faith (after
consultation with counsel) that the failure to do so would create a
material risk of a breach by Target's board of directors of its fiduciary or
other duties to Target's stockholders, or (ii) to disclose to a third party
the existence or terms of this letter agreement.
2. If (a) Target commits a willful and material breach of its
obligations under paragraph I of this letter agreement and (b) the
Prospective Acquirer shall not have materially breached the
Confidentiality Agreement, then Target will reimburse the Prospective
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Acquirer for any reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred by the Prospective Acquirer during the Exclusivity
Period in connection with the Prospective Acquirer's negotiation of the
Possible Transaction during the Exclusivity Period; provided, however,
that in no event will the aggregate amount payable by Target pursuant to
this paragraph 2 exceed $ . The right to reimbursement
contained in this paragraph 2 will be the Prospective Acquirer's sole and
exclusive remedy with respect to any willful and material breach by
Target of this letter agreement. Under no circumstances will Target have
any liability for any breach of this letter agreement that is not willful or
for any breach of this letter agreement that is not material.
3. Each Party acknowledges and agrees that no agreement
providing for the Possible Transaction will be deemed to exist between
the Parties unless and until a final, binding, definitive acquisition
agreement with respect to the Possible Transaction has been executed
and delivered by the Parties, and neither Party (and no affiliate of either
Party) will be under any obligation to negotiate or enter into any such
definitive acquisition agreement or transaction. The Parties also
acknowledge and agree that, unless and until a final, binding, definitive
acquisition agreement providing for the Possible Transaction has been
executed and delivered by the Parties, neither Party (and no affiliate of
either Party) will be under any legal obligation of any kind whatsoever
with respect to the Possible Transaction by virtue of this letter agreement
(except as expressly provided in this letter agreement).
4. This letter agreement and the Confidentiality Agreement set
forth the entire understanding of the Parties relating to the subject matter
hereof and thereof and supersede all prior agreements and
understandings between the Parties relating to the subject matter hereof
and thereof. Nothing contained in this letter agreement shall limit any of
the rights of Target or any of its affiliates, or any of the obligations of the
Prospective Acquirer, under the Confidentiality Agreement.
5. This letter agreement shall be governed in all respects by the
internal laws of the State of , and no action or proceeding
relating to this letter agreement may be brought or otherwise commenced
in any court outside the State of_.
6. For purposes of this letter agreement:
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(a) "Confidentiality Agreement" means the Confidentiality
Agreement dated as of , 20_ between the
Parties.
(b) "Exclusivity Period" means the period commencing on the
later of the date on which this letter agreement is executed
on behalf of the Prospective Acquirer and the date this letter
agreement is executed on behalf of Target and ending on
the earliest of: (i) _, 20_; (ii) the date on which
the Prospective Acquirer breaches any provision of this
letter agreement or the Confidentiality Agreement; and
(iii) the date on which the Prospective Acquirer terminates
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APPENDIX E
SAMPLE PROVISIONS RELATING TO TENDER OFFER
CONDITIONS AND TENDER OFFER EXTENSIONS IN
ACQUIRER'S FORM OF DEFINITIVE ACQUISITION
AGREEMENT FOR A TWO-STEP CASH ACQUISITION
OF TARGET COMPANY
[Note: It is assumed that the target company has no subsidiaries.]
ACQUISITION AGREEMENT
THIS ACQUISITION AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is made and
entered into as of , 20, by and among: [Acquirer Co.], a
Delaware corporation ("Acquirer"); [Acquisition Sub, Inc.], a Delaware
corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Acquirer ("Acquisition
Sub"); and [Target Co.], a Delaware corporation ("Target").
RECITALS
A. The boards of directors of Acquirer, Acquisition Sub and Target
have determined that it is in the best interests of their respective
stockholders for Acquirer to acquire Target upon the terms and subject to
the conditions set forth in this Agreement.
B. In furtherance of the contemplated acquisition of Target by
Acquirer, it is proposed: (a) that Acquisition Sub make a cash tender
offer (such cash tender offer, as it may be amended from time to time,
being referred to as the "Offer") to acquire all of the issued and
outstanding shares of common stock of Target ("Target Common
Stock") at a price of $_ per share (such dollar amount, or any greater
dollar amount per share paid pursuant to the Offer, being referred to as
the "Offer Price"), net to the seller in cash; and (b) that, after acquiring
shares of Target Common Stock pursuant to the Offer, Acquisition Sub
merge with and into Target upon the terms and subject to the conditions
set forth in this Agreement (the merger of Acquisition Sub into Target
being referred to as the "Merger").
C. In order to induce Acquirer and Acquisition Sub to enter into this
Agreement and to consummate the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement, concurrently with the execution and delivery of this
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Agreement, certain stockholders of Target are executing Stockholder
Agreements in favor of Acquirer and Acquisition Sub.
AGREEMENT
The parties to this Agreement, intending to be legally bound, agree as
follows:
SECTION 1.THE OFFER
1.1 Conduct of the Offer.
(a) Commencement of Offer. Acquisition Sub. shall
commence the Offer as promptly as practicable after the date of this
Agreement; provided, however, that Acquisition Sub shall not be
required to commence the Offer if (i) any of the conditions set forth in
clauses "(a)," "(b)," "(c)," "(h)," "(i)," "(j)," "(k)," "(1)" and "(m)" of
Annex I shall not be satisfied, or (ii) an event shall have occurred or a
circumstance shall exist that, in the reasonable judgment of Acquirer,
would make any of the conditions set forth in Annex I incapable of being
satisfied on or prior to the expiration date of the Offer.
(b) Offer Conditions. The obligation of Acquisition Sub to
accept for payment, and to pay for, shares of Target Common Stock
validly tendered (and not withdrawn) pursuant to the Offer shall be
subject to (i) the condition that there shall be validly tendered (and not
withdrawn) a number of shares of Target Common Stock that, together
with any shares of Target Common Stock owned by Acquirer or
Acquisition Sub immediately prior to the acceptance for payment of
shares of Target Common Stock pursuant to the Offer, represents more
than 50% of the Adjusted Outstanding Share Number (the "Minimum
Condition") and (ii) the other conditions set forth in Annex I. The
Minimum Condition and the other conditions set forth in Annex I are
referred to collectively as the "Offer Conditions." For purposes of this
Agreement, the "Adjusted Outstanding Share Number" shall be the sum
of (1) the aggregate number of shares of Target Common Stock issued
and outstanding immediately prior to the acceptance of shares of Target
Common Stock for payment pursuant to the Offer, plus (2) the aggregate
number of shares of Target Common Stock issuable upon the exercise of
all options, warrants and other rights to acquire Target Common Stock
(whether or not immediately exercisable) that are outstanding
immediately prior to the acceptance of shares of Target Common Stock
for payment pursuant to the Offer.
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(c) Changes to Offer. Acquisition Sub expressly reserves the
right, in its sole discretion, to increase the Offer Price and to waive or
make any other changes to the terms and conditions of the Offer;
provided, however, that without the prior written consent of Target:
(i) the Minimum Condition may not be amended or waived; and (ii) no
change may be made to the Offer that (A) changes the form of
consideration to be delivered by Acquisition Sub pursuant to the Offer,
(B) decreases the Offer Price or the number of shares of Target Common
Stock sought to be purchased by Acquisition Sub in the Offer,
(C) imposes conditions to the Offer in addition to the Offer Conditions,
or (D) except as provided in Section 1.1(d), extends the expiration date
of the Offer beyond the initial expiration date of the Offer. Subject to the
terms and conditions of the Offer and this Agreement, Acquisition Sub
shall accept for payment all shares of Target Common Stock validly
tendered (and not withdrawn) pursuant to the Offer as soon as practicable
after Acquisition Sub is permitted to do so under applicable laws, rules
and regulations.
(d) Expiration of Offer. The Offer shall initially be scheduled
to expire 20 business days following the date of the commencement
thereof (calculated as set forth in Rule 14d-l(g)(3) and Rule 14e-l(a)
under the Exchange Act). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this Agreement, but subject to the parties' respective
termination rights under Section 8.1: (i) if, on any date as of which the
Offer is scheduled to expire, any Offer Condition has not been satisfied
or waived, Acquisition Sub may, in its discretion (and without the
consent of Target or any other Person), extend the Offer from time to
time for such period of time as Acquisition Sub reasonably determines to
be necessary to permit such Offer Condition to be satisfied;
(ii) Acquisition Sub may, in its discretion (and without the consent of
Target or any other Person), extend the Offer from time to time for any
period required by any rule or regulation of the SEC applicable to the
Offer; (iii) [mandatory extensions of Offer]; and (iv) Acquisition Sub
may, in its discretion (and without the consent of Target or any other
Person), elect to provide for a subsequent offering period (and one or
more extensions thereof) in accordance with Rule 14d- 11 under the
Exchange Act.
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ANNEX I
CONDITIONS TO THE OFFER
The obligation of Acquisition Sub to accept for payment and pay for
shares of Target Common Stock validly tendered (and not withdrawn)
pursuant to the Offer is subject to the satisfaction of the Minimum
Condition and the additional conditions set forth in clauses "(a)" through
"(m)" below. Accordingly, notwithstanding any other provision of the
Offer or the Agreement, Acquisition Sub shall not be required to accept
for payment or pay for, and may delay the acceptance for payment or the
payment for, any tendered shares of Target Common Stock, and may
terminate the Offer on any scheduled expiration date and not accept for
payment any tendered shares of Target Common Stock, if (i) the
Minimum Condition shall not be satisfied by 12:00 midnight, Eastern
Time, on the expiration date of the Offer, or (ii) any of the following
additional conditions shall not be satisfied by 12:00 midnight, Eastern
Time, on the expiration date of the Offer:
(a) each of the representations and warranties of Target
contained in the Agreement shall have been accurate in all
material respects as of the date of the Agreement and shall be
accurate in all material respects as of the expiration date of the
Offer (as it may have been extended) as if made on and as of such
expiration date (it being understood that, for purposes of
determining the accuracy of such representations and warranties,
(i) all "Material Adverse Effect" qualifications and other
materiality qualifications contained in such representations and
warranties shall be disregarded and (ii) any update of or
modification to the Disclosure Schedule made or purported to
have been made on or after the date of the Agreement shall be
disregarded);
(b) each covenant or obligation that Target is required to
comply with or to perform at or prior to the Acceptance Time
shall have been complied with and performed in all material
respects;
(c) since the date of the Agreement, there shall not have been
any Material Adverse Effect (as defined below), and no event
shall have occurred or circumstance shall exist that, in
combination with any other events or circumstances, could
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reasonably be expected to have or result in a Material Adverse
Effect;
(d) the waiting period applicable to the Offer under the HSR
Act shall have expired or been terminated;
(e) any waiting period under any applicable foreign antitrust
or competition law, rule or regulation shall have expired or been
terminated, and any Consent required under any applicable
foreign antitrust or competition law, rule or regulation shall have
been obtained and shall be in full force and effect;
(f) all material Consents required to be obtained in connection
with the Offer, the Merger and the other transactions
contemplated by the Agreement (including the Consents
identified in Part of the Disclosure Schedule) shall have been
obtained and shall be in full force and effect;
(g) Acquirer and Target shall have received a certificate
executed by Target's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer confirming that the conditions set forth in clauses "(a),"
"(b)," "(c)" and "(f)" of this Annex I have been duly satisfied;
(h) no temporary restraining order, preliminary or permanent
injunction or other order preventing the acceptance for payment
or the acquisition of, or the payment for, shares of Target
Common Stock pursuant to the Offer, or preventing
consummation of the Merger or any of the other transactions
contemplated by the Agreement, shall have been issued by any
court of competent jurisdiction or other Governmental Body and
remain in effect, and there shall not be any Legal Requirement
enacted or deemed applicable to the Offer or the Merger or any of
the other transactions contemplated by the Agreement that makes
the acceptance for payment or the acquisition of, or payment for,
shares of Target Common Stock pursuant to the Offer, or the
consummation of the Merger or any of the other transactions
contemplated by the Agreement, illegal;
(i) there shall not be pending or threatened any Legal
Proceeding (i) challenging or seeking to restrain or prohibit
(A) the acceptance for payment or the acquisition of, or the
payment for, shares of Target Common Stock pursuant to the
Offer or (B) the consummation of the Merger or any of the other
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transactions contemplated by the Agreement, (ii) relating to the
Offer, the Merger or any of the other transactions contemplated
by the Agreement and seeking to obtain from Acquirer,
Acquisition Sub or Target any damages or other relief that may be
material to Acquirer or Target, (iii) seeking to prohibit or limit in
any material respect the right or ability of Acquirer or Acquisition
Sub to vote, receive dividends with respect to or otherwise
exercise ownership rights with respect to shares of the stock of
Target or the Surviving Corporation, (iv) that could materially
and adversely affect the right or ability of Acquirer or Target to
own any of the material assets or operate the business of Target,
or (v) seeking to compel Acquirer, any of Acquirer's subsidiaries
or Target to dispose of or hold separate any material assets as a
result of the Offer, the Merger or any of the other transactions
contemplated by the Agreement;
(j) since the date of the Agreement, there shall not have been
a material adverse development in any Legal Proceeding pending
against Target;
(k) there shall not have occurred (i) any general suspension of
trading in securities on the New York Stock Exchange, (ii) any
declaration by a Governmental Body of a banking moratorium in
the United States or in any other jurisdiction in which Acquirer,
any subsidiary of Acquirer or Target has material assets or
operations, or any suspension of payments in respect of banks in
the United States or in any other jurisdiction in which Acquirer,
any subsidiary of Acquirer or Target has material assets or
operations, or (iii) any war, armed hostilities, act of terrorism or
other international or national calamity directly or indirectly
involving the United States or any other jurisdiction in which
Acquirer, any subsidiary of Acquirer or Target has material assets
or operations;
(1) no Triggering Event (as defined below) shall have
occurred; and
(m) the Agreement shall not have been terminated.
The foregoing conditions are for the sole benefit of Acquirer and
Acquisition Sub and may be waived by Acquirer and Acquisition Sub, in
whole or in part at any time and from time to time, in the sole discretion
of Acquirer and Acquisition Sub.
716 [Vol. 116:3
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
For purposes of the Agreement (including Annex I):
(1) "Material Adverse Effect" means any effect, change,
development, event or circumstance that, considered together with all
other effects, changes, developments, events or circumstances, is or
could reasonably be expected to be or to become materially adverse to,
or has or could reasonably be expected to have or result in a material
adverse effect on, (A) the business, condition (financial or otherwise),
cash position, liquidity, working capital, capitalization, assets (tangible
or intangible), liabilities (fixed, contingent or otherwise), operations,
cash flow, financial performance or prospects of Target, (B) the ability of
Target to consummate the Merger or any of the other transactions
contemplated by the Agreement or to perform any of its obligations
under the Agreement, (C) the right or ability of Acquirer or Acquisition
Sub to vote, receive dividends with respect to or otherwise exercise
ownership rights with respect to shares of the stock of Target or the
Surviving Corporation, or (D) the rights of Acquirer or Acquisition Sub
under the Agreement or relating to the Offer, the Merger or any of the
other transactions contemplated by the Agreement.
(2) A "Triggering Event" shall be deemed to have occurred if:
(A) the board of directors of Target shall have (x) failed to unanimously
recommend that Target's stockholders accept the Offer and tender their
shares of Target Common Stock pursuant to the Offer or that Target's
stockholders vote to adopt the Agreement, (y) withdrawn or modified in
a manner adverse to Acquirer the Target Board Recommendation, or
(z) taken any other action that is reasonably determined by Acquirer to
suggest that the board of directors of Target might not unanimously
support the Offer or the Merger or might not believe that the Offer and
the Merger are in the best interests of Target's stockholders; (B) Target
shall have failed to include in the Offer Documents the Target Board
Recommendation or a statement to the effect that the board of directors
of Target has determined and believes that the Offer and the Merger are
in the best interests of Target's stockholders; (C) the board of directors of
Target fails to reaffirm publicly the Target Board Recommendation, or
fails to reaffirm publicly its determination that the Offer and the Merger
are in the best interests of Target's stockholders, within five business
days after Acquirer requests in writing that such recommendation or
determination be reaffirmed publicly; (D) Target or the board of directors
of Target shall have approved, endorsed or recommended any
Acquisition Proposal; (E) Target shall have entered into any letter of
intent or similar document or any agreement relating to any Acquisition
Proposal; (F) a tender or exchange offer relating to securities of Target
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shall have been commenced and Target shall not have sent to its security
holders, within ten business days after the commencement of such tender
or exchange offer, a statement disclosing that the board of directors of
Target recommends rejection of such tender or exchange offer; (G) an
Acquisition Proposal is publicly announced, and Target (x) fails to issue
a press release announcing its opposition to such Acquisition Proposal
within five business days after such Acquisition Proposal is publicly
announced or (y) otherwise fails to actively oppose such Acquisition
Proposal; (H) any Person or "group" (as defined in the Exchange Act and
the rules thereunder) of Persons directly or indirectly acquires or agrees
to acquire, or discloses an intention to acquire, beneficial or record
ownership of securities representing more than 15% of the outstanding
securities of any class of voting securities of Target; (I) Target or any
Representative of Target shall have breached or taken any action
inconsistent with any of the provisions set forth in Section 5.3 [the "No-
Shop/No-Talk" provisions]; or (J) any stockholder of Target who has
executed a Stockholder Agreement shall have materially breached such
Stockholder Agreement.
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APPENDIX F
EXCERPTS FROM SAMPLE RESPONSE BY TARGET
COMPANY TO TENDER OFFER CONDITIONS AND EXTENSION
PRO VISIONS PROPOSED BY A CQUIRER
* Insert a provision in Section 1.1 (d)(iii) requiring Acquisition Sub to
extend the Offer at Target's request if the Minimum Condition or
any other Offer Condition has not been satisfied as of the expiration
of the Offer.
* Modify the "bring-down" condition (clause "(a)" of Annex I) (1) to
eliminate the "accurate . .. as of the date of the Agreement" prong,
and (2) to provide that this condition will be deemed satisfied
notwithstanding the existence of inaccuracies in Target's
representations and warranties so long as the inaccuracies do not
have a "Material Adverse Effect."
* Modify the definition of "Material Adverse Effect" to read as
follows:
"'Material Adverse Effect' means a material adverse effect on the
business, financial condition or results of operations of Target;
provided, however, that none of the following shall be deemed
(either alone or in combination) to constitute, and none of the
following shall be taken into account in determining whether there
has been or would be, such a material adverse effect:
(i) any failure on the part of Target to meet internal or other
estimates, predictions, projections or forecasts of revenue,
net income or any other measure of financial performance;
(ii) any adverse effect (including any litigation, loss of
employees, cancellation of or delay in customer orders,
reduction in revenue or net income or disruption of business
relationships) arising from or attributable or relating to
(A) the announcement or pendency of the Offer, the Merger
or any of the other transactions contemplated by the
Agreement, (B) conditions affecting the industry or any
industry sector in which Target operates or participates, the
U.S. economy or financial markets or any foreign economy
or financial markets in any location where Target has
material operations or sales, (C) any act of terrorism or war,
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or any armed hostilities, anywhere in the world, (D) legal,
accounting, investment banking or other fees or expenses
incurred in connection with the Offer, the Merger or any of
the other transactions contemplated by the Agreement, (E)
the payment of any amounts due to, or the provision of any
other benefits to, any officers or other employees under
employment contracts, non-competition agreements,
employee benefit plans, severance arrangements or other
arrangements in existence as of the date of the Agreement,
(F) compliance with the terms of, or the taking of any
action required by, the Agreement, (G) the taking of any
action by Acquirer or any action approved or consented to
by Acquirer, (H) any breach of the Agreement by Acquirer,
(I) any change in accounting requirements or principles or
any change in applicable laws, rules or regulations or the
interpretation thereof, or (J) any action required to be taken
under applicable laws, rules, regulations or agreements; or
(iii) any adverse effect that is temporary in nature."
* Modify the "litigation out" (clause "(i)" of Annex I) so that it
applies only to litigation brought by a U.S. federal or state
governmental body with respect to the Offer or the Merger.
* Eliminate clauses "()" and "(k)" of Annex I.
* Narrow the definition of "Triggering Event" (as used in clause "(1)"
of Annex I) so that it refers only to withdrawals and adverse
modifications of the Target Board Recommendation.
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APPENDIX G
SAMPLE PROVISIONS REGARDING RECOMMENDATION
OF TARGET COMPANY'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN
ACQUIRER'S FORM OF DEFINITIVE ACQUISITION
AGREEMENT FOR A TWO-STEP CASH ACQUISITION OF
TARGET COMPANY
1.2 Target Board Recommendation.
(a) Target represents and warrants to Acquirer and Acquisition Sub
that Target's board of directors, at a meeting duly called and held, has,
by the unanimous vote of all directors of Target, resolved to recommend
that the stockholders of Target accept the Offer and tender their shares of
Target Common Stock pursuant to the Offer and (if required by
applicable law in order to consummate the Merger) adopt this Agreement
(the unanimous recommendation of Target's board of directors that the
stockholders of Target accept the Offer and tender their shares of Target
Common Stock pursuant to the Offer and (if required by applicable law
in order to consummate the Merger) adopt this Agreement being referred
to as the "Target Board Recommendation"). Subject to Section 1.2(b):
(i) Target consents to the inclusion of Target Board Recommendation in
the Offer Documents; and (ii) the Target Board Recommendation shall
not be withdrawn or modified in a manner adverse to Acquirer or
Acquisition Sub, and no resolution or proposal by the board of directors
of Target or any committee thereof to withdraw the Target Board
Recommendation or to modify the Target Board Recommendation in a
manner adverse to Acquirer or Acquisition Sub shall be adopted or
announced (it being understood that the Target Board Recommendation
shall be deemed to have been modified in a manner adverse to Acquirer
and Acquisition Sub if the Target Board Recommendation is no longer
unanimous).
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Section
1.2(a), at any time prior to the Acceptance Time, the Target Board
Recommendation may be withdrawn or modified in a manner adverse to
Acquirer or Acquisition Sub if: (i) an unsolicited, bona fide, written
offer by a third party unaffiliated with Target to purchase all of the
issued and outstanding shares of Target Common Stock is made to
Target and is not withdrawn; (ii) Target provides Acquirer with at least
three business days' prior notice of any meeting of Target's board of
directors or any committee thereof at which Target's board of directors
or such committee will consider such offer or determine whether such
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offer is a Superior Offer; (iii) Target's board of directors determines in
good faith (based upon a written opinion of an independent financial
advisor of nationally recognized reputation) that such offer constitutes a
Superior Offer; (iv) Target's board of directors determines in good faith,
after having taken into account the advice of outside legal counsel, that,
in light of such Superior Offer, the withdrawal of the Target Board
Recommendation or the modification of the Target Board
Recommendation in a manner adverse to Acquirer or Acquisition Sub is
required in order for Target's board of directors to comply with its
fiduciary obligations to the stockholders of Target under applicable law;
(v) the Target Board Recommendation is not withdrawn or modified in a
manner adverse to Acquirer or Acquisition Sub at any time within three
business days after Acquirer receives written notice from Target
confirming that Target's board of directors has determined that such
offer is a Superior Offer; and (vi) neither Target nor any of its
Representatives shall have breached or taken any action inconsistent with
any of the provisions set forth in Section 5.3 [the "No-Shop/No-Talk"
provisions].
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APPENDIX H
EXCERPTS FROM SAMPLE RESPONSE BY TARGET
COMPANY TO BOARD RECOMMENDATION PROVISIONS
PROPOSED BY A CQUIRER
* Delete the language in parentheses at the end of the final sentence of
Section 1.2(a) (in order to clarify that a single director's decision to
withdraw his or her support of the Offer will not constitute a breach
of the recommendation covenant, so long as a majority of the board
continues to support the Offer).
* Modify the "fiduciary exception" (Section 1.2(b)) to read as
follows:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
Agreement: (i) the Target Board Recommendation may be
withdrawn or modified in a manner adverse to Acquirer or
Acquisition Sub if Target's board of directors determines in good
faith, after consultation with counsel, that failing to withdraw or
modify the Target Board Recommendation would create a material
risk of a breach by Target's board of directors of its fiduciary duties
under applicable law; and (ii) Target may make any disclosure that
Target determines in good faith to be required by any applicable
law, rule, regulation or duty."
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APPENDIX I
EXCERPTS FROM SAMPLE PROVISION (PROPOSED BY
ACQUIRER) PERMITTING CHANGE IN RECOMMENDATION
OF TARGET COMPANY'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS AFTER AN
"INTERVENING EVENT"
The Target Board Recommendation may also be withdrawn in a manner
adverse to Acquirer or Acquisition Sub if: (i) an Intervening Event
occurs; (ii) Target's board of directors determines in good faith, after
having taken into account the advice of outside legal counsel and the
advice of Target's financial advisor, that, in light of such Intervening
Event, the withdrawal of the Target Board Recommendation or the
modification of the Target Board Recommendation in a manner adverse
to Acquirer or Acquisition Sub is required in order for Target's board of
directors to comply with its fiduciary obligations to the stockholders of
Target under applicable law; ...
"Intervening Event" means an event favorable to Target that occurs after
the date of this Agreement and prior to the Acceptance Time and that
was not foreseeable and could not be taken into account at the time the
Target's board of directors made the Target Board Recommendation.
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APPENDIX J
SAMPLE "NO-SHOP/NO-TALK" PROVISIONS IN
ACQUIRER'S FORM OF DEFINITIVE ACQUISITION
AGREEMENT FOR A TWO-STEP CASH ACQUISITION OF
TARGET COMPANY
5.3 No Solicitation.
(a) Target shall not directly or indirectly, and shall ensure that its
Representatives do not directly or indirectly, (i) solicit, initiate,
encourage, induce or facilitate the making, submission or announcement
of any Acquisition Proposal or Acquisition Inquiry, or take any action
that could reasonably be expected to lead to an Acquisition Proposal or
Acquisition Inquiry, (ii) furnish any information regarding Target to any
Person in connection with or in response to an Acquisition Proposal or
Acquisition Inquiry, (iii) engage in discussions or negotiations with any
Person with respect to any Acquisition Proposal or Acquisition Inquiry,
(iv) approve, endorse or recommend any Acquisition Proposal or
(v) enter into any letter of intent or similar document or any agreement
contemplating or otherwise relating to any Acquisition Transaction;
provided, however, that prior to the Acceptance Time, this Section 5.3(a)
shall not prohibit Target from furnishing nonpublic information
regarding Target to, or entering into discussions with, any Person in
response to a Superior Offer that is submitted to Target by such Person
(and not withdrawn) if (1) neither Target nor any Representative of
Target shall have breached or taken any action inconsistent with any of
the provisions set forth in this Section 5.3, (2) the board of directors of
Target concludes in good faith, after having taken into account the advice
of outside legal counsel, that such action is required in order for Target's
board of directors to comply with its fiduciary obligations to the
stockholders of Target under applicable law, (3) at least two business
days prior to furnishing any such nonpublic information to, or entering
into discussions with, such Person, Target gives Acquirer written notice
of the identity of such Person and of Target's intention to furnish
nonpublic information to, or enter into discussions with, such Person,
and Target receives from such Person an executed confidentiality
agreement containing customary limitations on the use and disclosure of
all nonpublic written and oral information furnished to such Person by or
on behalf of Target and containing "standstill" provisions and other
provisions at least as favorable to Target as those contained in the
Confidentiality Agreement between Acquirer and Target dated
, 20_, and (4) at least two business days prior to
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furnishing any such nonpublic information to such Person, Target
furnishes such nonpublic information to Acquirer (to the extent such
nonpublic information has not been previously furnished by Target to
Acquirer). Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Target
acknowledges and agrees that any action inconsistent with any of the
provisions set forth in the preceding sentence by any Representative of
Target, whether or not such Representative is purporting to act on behalf
of Target, shall be deemed to constitute a breach of this Section 5.3 by
Target.
(b) Target shall promptly (and in no event later than 24 hours after
receipt of any Acquisition Proposal or Acquisition Inquiry) advise
Acquirer orally and in writing of any Acquisition Proposal or Acquisition
Inquiry (including the identity of the Person making or submitting such
Acquisition Proposal or Acquisition Inquiry and the terms thereof).
Target shall keep Acquirer fully informed with respect to the status of
any such Acquisition Proposal or Acquisition Inquiry, and any
modification or proposed modification thereto.
(c) Target shall immediately cease and cause to be terminated any
existing discussions with any Person that relate to any Acquisition
Proposal or Acquisition Inquiry.
(d) Target agrees not to release or permit the release of any Person
from, or to waive or permit the waiver of any provision of, any
confidentiality, "standstill" or similar agreement to which Target is a
party or under which Target has any rights, and shall use its best efforts
to enforce each such agreement to the extent requested by Acquirer.
Target also shall promptly request each Person that has executed, on or
after , 20_, a confidentiality agreement in connection
with its consideration of a possible Acquisition Transaction or equity
investment in Target to return all confidential information heretofore
furnished to such Person by or on behalf of Target, and Target shall use
its best efforts to cause the return of such confidential information.
(e) For purposes of this Agreement:
(i) "Acquisition Inquiry" means any (A) request for nonpublic
information relating to Target or (B) inquiry or expression of
interest that could reasonably be expected to lead to any Acquisition
Proposal or any request for nonpublic information relating to
Target.
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(ii) "Acquisition Proposal" means any offer or proposal (other
than an offer or proposal made or submitted by Acquirer)
contemplating or otherwise relating to any Acquisition Transaction.
(iii) "Acquisition Transaction" means any transaction or series
of transactions involving:
(A) any merger, consolidation, amalgamation, share
exchange, business combination, issuance of securities,
acquisition of securities, recapitalization, reorganization,
tender offer, exchange offer or other similar transaction
(i) in which Target or a subsidiary of Target is a
constituent corporation, (ii) in which a Person or "group"
(as defined in the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder)
of Persons directly or indirectly acquires beneficial or
record ownership of securities representing more than 5%
of the issued and outstanding securities of any class of
voting securities of Target, or (iii) in which Target issues
securities representing more than 5% of the issued and
outstanding securities of any class of voting securities of
Target;
(B) any sale, lease, exchange, transfer, license,
acquisition or disposition of any business or businesses or
assets that constitute or account for 5% or more of the net
revenues, net income or assets of Target; or
(C) any liquidation or dissolution of Target.
(iv) "Superior Offer" means an unsolicited, bona fide, written
offer made by a third party unaffiliated with Target to purchase all
of the issued and outstanding shares of Target Common Stock on
terms that the board of directors of Target determines, in its
reasonable judgment, based upon a written opinion of an
independent financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation, to
be more favorable to Target's stockholders than the terms of the
Offer and the Merger.
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APPENDIX K
SAMPLE RESPONSE BY TARGET COMPANY TO "NO-
SHOP/NO-TALK" PROVISIONS PROPOSED B YACQUIRER
5.3 No Solicitation.
(a) Target will not, and Target will use reasonable efforts to cause
its Representatives not to: (i) solicit or knowingly encourage the
submission of any proposal by a third party for a merger or consolidation
involving Target and such third party or for any purchase by such third
party of more than 20% of the assets or outstanding stock of Target (any
such proposal being referred to as an "Acquisition Proposal"); or
(ii) engage in any negotiations with a third party concerning, or provide
any confidential information regarding Target to a third party in response
to, an Acquisition Proposal made by such third party; provided, however,
that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
Agreement, (A) Target and its Representatives may engage in any such
negotiations and may provide any such confidential information if
Target's board of directors determines in good faith, after consultation
with counsel, that failure to do so would create a material risk of a breach
by Target's board of directors of its fiduciary duties to Target's
stockholders under applicable law, and (B) Target or its board of
directors may accept an Acquisition Proposal and may enter into a
definitive agreement relating to an Acquisition Proposal if Target's board
of directors determines in good faith, after consultation with counsel and
its financial advisor, that the terms of such Acquisition Proposal are more
favorable to Target's stockholders than the terms of the Offer. Target
will immediately cease and cause to be terminated any existing
negotiations between Target and any third party relating to any pending
Acquisition Proposal. Target will promptly notify Parent if any
Acquisition Proposal is received by Target in writing from a third party.
(b) Nothing contained in this Section 5.3 or elsewhere in this
Agreement shall prohibit Target or its board of directors from complying
with Rule 14d-9 or Rule 14e-2 under the Exchange Act or from
furnishing a copy or excerpts of this Agreement to any Person that makes
an Acquisition Proposal or that makes an inquiry that could lead to an
Acquisition Proposal.
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APPENDIX L
SAMPLE TERMINATION AND "BREAK-UP" FEE
PROVISIONS IN ACQUIRER'S FORM OF DEFINITIVE
ACQUISITION A GREEMENT FOR A TWO-STEP CASH
ACQUISITION OF TARGET COMPANY
SECTION 8. TERMINATION
8.1Termination. This Agreement may be terminated:
(a) by mutual written consent of Acquirer and Target at any
time prior to the Effective Time;
(b) by either Acquirer or Target at any time prior to the
Effective Time if a court of competent jurisdiction or other
Governmental Body shall have issued a final and nonappealable
order, decree or ruling, or shall have taken any other action, having
the effect of (i) permanently restraining, enjoining or otherwise
prohibiting (A) the acceptance for payment or the acquisition of, or
the payment for, any shares of Target Common Stock pursuant to
the Offer or (B) the consummation of the Merger or (ii) making the
acceptance for payment or the acquisition of, or the payment for,
any shares of Target Common Stock pursuant to Offer, or the
consummation of the Merger, illegal;
(c) by either Acquirer or Target at any time prior to the
Acceptance Time if the Offer shall have expired without the
acceptance for payment of shares of Target Common Stock;
provided, however, that: (i) a party shall not be permitted to
terminate this Agreement pursuant to this Section 8.1(c) if the
failure to accept shares of Target Common Stock for payment
pursuant to the Offer is attributable to a failure on the part of such
party to perform any covenant in this Agreement required to be
performed by such party at or prior to the Acceptance Time; and
(ii) Target shall not be permitted to terminate this Agreement
pursuant to this Section 8.1(c) unless Target shall have made any
payment required to be made to Acquirer pursuant to Section 8.3(a)
and shall have paid to Acquirer any fee required to be paid to
Acquirer pursuant to Section 8.3(c);
(d) by either Acquirer or Target at any time prior to the
Acceptance Time if the acceptance of shares of Target Common
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Stock for payment pursuant to the Offer shall not have occurred
prior to the close of business on , 20_; provided,
however, that: (i) a party shall not be permitted to terminate this
Agreement pursuant to this Section 8.1(d) if the failure to accept
shares of Target Common Stock for payment pursuant to the Offer
prior to the close of business on , 20 is attributable
to a failure on the part of such party to perform any covenant in this
Agreement required to be performed by such party at or prior to the
Acceptance Time; and (ii) Target shall not be permitted to terminate
this Agreement pursuant to this Section 8.1(d) unless Target shall
have made any payment required to be made to Acquirer pursuant
to Section 8.3(a) and shall have paid to Acquirer any fee required to
be paid to Acquirer pursuant to Section 8.3(c);
(e) by Acquirer if a Triggering Event shall have occurred;
(f) by Acquirer if: (i) any of Target's representations and
warranties contained in this Agreement shall be inaccurate as of the
date of this Agreement or shall have become inaccurate as of a date
subsequent to the date of this Agreement (as if made on such
subsequent date), in either case such that the condition set forth in
clause "(a)" of Annex I would not be satisfied (it being understood
that, for purposes of determining the accuracy of such
representations and warranties as of the date of this Agreement or as
of any subsequent date, (A) all "Material Adverse Effect"
qualifications and other materiality qualifications contained in such
representations and warranties shall be disregarded and (B) any
update of or modification to the Disclosure Schedule made or
purported to have been made on or after the date of this Agreement
shall be disregarded); or (ii) any of Target's covenants contained in
this Agreement shall have been breached such that the condition set
forth in clause "(b)" of Annex I would not be satisfied;
(g) by Target if (i) Acquirer shall have committed a material
breach of Acquirer's material covenants contained in this
Agreement, (ii) Target shall have delivered a written notice of such
breach to Acquirer, and (iii) such breach shall not have been cured
in all material respects within 30 days after the delivery by Target
of such written notice to Acquirer; or
(h) by Acquirer if, since the date of this Agreement, (i) a
Material Adverse Effect shall have occurred, or (ii) any event shall
have occurred or circumstance shall have arisen that, in
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combination with any other events or circumstances, could
reasonably be expected to have or result in a Material Adverse
Effect.
8.2 Effect of Termination. In the event of the termination of this
Agreement as provided in Section 8.1, this Agreement shall be of no
further force or effect; provided, however, that (i) this Section 8.2,
Section 8.3 and Section 9 shall survive the termination of this Agreement
and shall remain in full force and effect, (ii) the termination of this
Agreement shall not relieve any party from any liability for any breach of
any representation, warranty, covenant, obligation or other provision
contained in this Agreement, and (iii) no termination of this Agreement
shall in any way affect any of the parties' rights or obligations with
respect to any shares of Target Common Stock accepted for payment
pursuant to the Offer prior to such termination.
8.3 Expenses; Termination Fees.
(a) Except as set forth in this Section 8.3, all fees and expenses
incurred in connection with this Agreement and the Offer, the
Merger and the other transactions contemplated by this Agreement
shall be paid by the party incurring such expenses, whether or not
any shares of Target Common Stock are purchased pursuant to the
Offer and whether or not the Merger is consummated; provided,
however, that:
(i) Acquirer and Target shall share equally (A) all fees
and expenses, other than attorneys' fees, incurred in
connection with the filing, printing and mailing of the Offer
Documents and any amendments or supplements thereto, and
(B) all fees relating to the filing by the parties to this
Agreement of forms and other documents under the HSR Act
and under any applicable foreign antitrust or competition law,
rule or regulation; and
(ii) if this Agreement is terminated by Acquirer or Target
pursuant to Section 8.1(c) or Section 8.1(d) and at or prior to
the time of the termination of this Agreement an Acquisition
Proposal shall have been disclosed, announced, commenced,
submitted or made, or if this Agreement is terminated by
Acquirer pursuant to Section 8.1(e), then (without limiting any
obligation of Target to pay any fee payable pursuant to Section
8.3(c)), Target shall make a nonrefundable cash payment to
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Acquirer, at the time specified in Section 8.3(b), in an amount
equal to the aggregate amount of all fees and expenses
(including all attorneys' fees, accountants' fees, financial
advisory fees and filing fees) that have been paid and that are
or may become payable by or on behalf of Acquirer in
connection with the preparation and negotiation of this
Agreement and otherwise in connection with the Offer, the
Merger and the other transactions contemplated by this
Agreement.
(b) In the case of termination of this Agreement by Target
pursuant to Section 8.1(c) or Section 8.1(d), any nonrefundable
payment required to be made pursuant to clause "(ii)" of the proviso
to Section 8.3(a) shall be made by Target prior to the time of such
termination; and in the case of termination of this Agreement by
Acquirer pursuant to Section 8.1(c), Section 8.1(d) or Section
8.1(e), any nonrefundable payment required to be made pursuant to
clause "(ii)" of the proviso to Section 8.3(a) shall be made by Target
within two business days after such termination.
(c) If (i) this Agreement is terminated by Acquirer or Target
pursuant to Section 8.1(c) or Section 8.1(d) and at or prior to the
time of the termination of this Agreement an Acquisition Proposal
shall have been disclosed, announced, commenced, submitted or
made, or (ii) this Agreement is terminated by Acquirer pursuant to
Section 8.1(e), then Target shall pay to Acquirer, in cash at the time
specified in the next sentence (and in addition to the amounts
payable pursuant to Section 8.3(a)), a nonrefundable fee in the
amount of $ . In the case of termination of this
Agreement by Target pursuant to Section 8.1(c) or Section 8.1(d),
the fee referred to in the preceding sentence shall be paid by Target
prior to the time of such termination; and in the case of termination
of this Agreement by Acquirer pursuant to Section 8.1(c), Section
8.1(d) or Section 8.1(e), the fee referred to in the preceding sentence
shall be paid by Target within two business days after such
termination.
(d) If Target fails to pay when due any amount payable under
this Section 8.3, then (i) Target shall reimburse Acquirer for all
costs and expenses (including fees and disbursements of counsel)
incurred in connection with the collection of such overdue amount
and the enforcement by Acquirer of its rights under this Section 8.3,
and (ii) Target shall pay to Acquirer interest on such overdue
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amount (for the period commencing as of the date such overdue
amount was originally required to be paid and ending on the date
such overdue amount is actually paid to Acquirer in full) at a rate
per annum three percentage points over the "prime rate" (as
announced by or any successor thereto) in
effect on the date such overdue amount was originally required to
be paid.
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APPENDIX M
EXCERPTS FROM SAMPLE RESPONSE BY TARGET
COMPANY TO TERMINATION AND "BREAK-UP" FEE
PRO VISIONS PROPOSED BY A CQUIRER
* Narrow the definition of "Triggering Event" (as used in Section
8.1(e)) so that it refers only to withdrawals and adverse
modifications of the Target Board Recommendation.
* Add a clause permitting Target to terminate the Acquisition
Agreement (upon payment of a "break-up" fee) in order to accept a
Superior Offer.
* Modify Section 8.2 to clarify that the parties will remain liable only
for their willful breaches after termination of the Acquisition
Agreement.
* Increase the percentage threshold in the definition of Acquisition
Proposal to 50% for purposes of Section 8.3.
* Modify Sections 8.3(a) and 8.3(c) to provide that Target will not be
required to pay a "break-up" fee (or reimburse Acquirer's fees or
expenses) if Acquirer shall have breached the Acquisition
Agreement.
* Modify Sections 8.3(a) and 8.3(c) so that, in the situation where a
third party makes a competing bid to acquire Target and Target's
board of directors continues to support the Offer, but the Offer is
ultimately unsuccessful, Target need not pay Acquirer a "break-up"
fee (or reimburse Acquirer's fees and expenses) unless Target is
actually acquired by another bidder within 180 days after the
termination of the Acquisition Agreement.
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APPENDIX N
SAMPLE NON-RELIANCE PRO VISION PROPOSED BY
TARGET COMPANY
Acquirer and Acquisition Sub acknowledge and agree that:
(a) Target has not made and is not making, and neither Acquirer nor
Acquisition Sub has relied or is relying upon, any representations or
warranties whatsoever, express or implied, regarding Target, regarding
Target's business or capitalization, regarding Target's past or future
performance or otherwise relating in any way to the subject matter of this
Agreement, except as expressly provided in Section 3; and (b) no
Representative of Target has made or is making any representations or
warranties whatsoever, express or implied, regarding Target, regarding
Target's business or capitalization, regarding Target's past or future
performance or otherwise relating in any way to the subject matter of this
Agreement. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Acquirer
and Acquisition Sub acknowledge and agree that Target has not made
and is not making, and neither Acquirer nor Acquisition Sub has relied or
is relying upon, any representations or warranties whatsoever, express or
implied, regarding the future revenues, future results of operations or
future financial condition of Target or regarding any projections,
forecasts, estimates or budgets discussed with, delivered to or made
available to Acquirer or any of Acquirer's Representatives.
7352012]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX 0
ILLUSTRATION OF ACQUISITION OF TARGET COMPANY
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APPENDIX P
ILL USTRA TION OF TWO-STEP CASH ACQUISITION OF
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APPENDIX Q*
SAMPLE CONDITIONS TO CLOSING OF BA CK-END MERGER
IN DEFINITIVE ACQUISITION AGREEMENT FOR A TWO-STEP
CASH ACQUISITION
Excerpt from Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of July 14, 2011,
among BHP Billiton Limited, BHP Billiton Petroleum (North America)
Inc., North America Holdings II Inc. and Petrohawk Energy Corporation:
SECTION 8.01 Conditions to Each Party's Obligation to Effect the
Merger. The respective obligation of each Party to effect the Merger is
subject to the satisfaction or (to the extent permitted by Law) waiver by
such Party on or prior to the Closing of the following conditions:
(a) Stockholder Approval. If required by applicable Law, the
Target Stockholder Approval shall have been obtained.
(b) No Injunctions or Restraints. No Governmental Entity of
competent jurisdiction shall have enacted, issued, promulgated, enforced
or entered any Law or Order or taken any other action that is in effect
and makes illegal, restrains, enjoins or otherwise prohibits consummation
of the Merger on the terms contemplated by this Agreement (any Law or
Order which is in effect and makes illegal, restrains, enjoins or otherwise
prohibits the Offer or the consummation of the Offer, the Merger or the
other transactions contemplated hereby on the terms contemplated by
this Agreement, collectively, "Restraining Orders").
(c) Purchase of Shares in the Offer. Acquisition Sub shall have
accepted for payment and paid for all Shares validly tendered and not
properly withdrawn pursuant to the Offer.
* Note: In order to make the terminology in this Appendix consistent with the
terminology in other Appendices, each reference to "the Company" has been changed to
"Target," and each reference to "Merger Sub" has been changed to "Acquisition Sub."
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APPENDIX R*
SAMPLE TOP-UP OPTION PRO VISION IN DEFINITIVE
ACQUISITIONAGREEMENT FOR A TWO-STEP CASH
ACQUISITION
Excerpt from Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of July 14, 2011,
among BHP Billiton Limited, BHP Billiton Petroleum (North America)
Inc., North America Holdings II Inc. and Petrohawk Energy Corporation:
SECTION 1.04 Top-Up Option.
(a) Top-Up Option Grant. Target hereby grants to Acquisition
Sub an irrevocable option (the "Top-Up Option") to purchase at a price
per share equal to the Offer Price that number of shares of Common
Stock (the "Top-Up Option Shares") equal to the lowest number of
shares of Common Stock that, when added to the number of Shares
owned by Parent and its Affiliates at the time of such exercise, shall
constitute one share of Common Stock more than the number of Shares
(the "Short-Form Threshold") necessary for Acquisition Sub to be
merged into Target without a vote or consent of Target's stockholders in
accordance with Section 253 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(the "DGCL"); provided, however, that in no event shall the Top-Up
Option be exercisable (i) to the extent that the number of Top-Up Option
Shares would exceed the number of Target's then authorized and
unissued shares of Common Stock that are not otherwise reserved or
committed to be issued; and (ii) unless, immediately after such exercise
and the issuance of the Top-Up Option Shares pursuant thereto, the
Short-Form Threshold would be reached (after giving effect to the
issuance of the Top-Up Option Shares).
(b) Exercise of Top-Up. The Top-Up Option shall only be
exercisable once in whole and not in part after the Acceptance Time and
prior to the earlier of the Effective Time and the termination of this
Agreement in accordance with Article IX. In the event Acquisition Sub
wishes to exercise the Top-Up Option, Acquisition Sub shall so notify
Target in writing, and shall set forth in such notice (i) the number of
Shares owned by Parent and its Affiliates immediately preceding the
exercise of the Top-Up Option and (ii) the place and time for the closing
* Note: In order to make the terminology in this Appendix consistent with the
terminology in other Appendices, each reference to "the Company" has been changed to
"Target," and each reference to "Merger Sub" has been changed to "Acquisition Sub."
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of the exercise of the Top-Up Option (the "Top-Up Closing"). Target
shall, as soon as practicable following receipt of such notice, notify
Parent in writing of the number of Shares and the number of Top-Up
Option Shares and, upon request of Parent, Target shall use its
reasonable best efforts to cause its transfer agent to certify in writing to
Acquisition Sub the number of Shares as of immediately prior to the
exercise of the Top-Up Option. At the Top-Up Closing, Acquisition Sub
shall cause Target to be paid the aggregate price required to be paid for
the Top-Up Option Shares and Target shall cause to be issued to
Acquisition Sub a certificate representing the Top-Up Option Shares.
The purchase price owed by Acquisition Sub to Target to purchase the
Top-Up Option Shares shall be paid to Target at the Top-Up Closing, at
Acquisition Sub's option, (i) in cash, by wire transfer of same-day funds,
or (ii) by (x) paying in cash, by wire transfer of same-day funds, an
amount equal to not less than the aggregate par value of the Top-Up
Option Shares and (y) executing and delivering to Target a promissory
note having a principal amount equal to the aggregate purchase price for
the Top-Up Option Shares less the amount paid in cash pursuant to the
immediately preceding clause (x) (the "Promissory Note"). The
Promissory Note (A) shall be due on the first anniversary of the Top-Up
Closing, (B) shall bear simple interest of 5% per annum, (C) shall be full
recourse to Acquisition Sub, (D) may be prepaid, in whole or in part, at
any time without premium or penalty and (E) shall have no other
material terms. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing herein shall be
construed to obligate Acquisition Sub to exercise the Top-Up Option.
(c) Exemption from Registration. Parent and Acquisition Sub
acknowledge that the Top-Up Option Shares that Acquisition Sub may
acquire upon exercise of the Top-Up Option will not be registered under
the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, as amended (the "Securities Act"), and will be
issued in reliance upon an applicable exemption from registration under
the Securities Act for transactions not involving a public offering. Parent
and Acquisition Sub hereby represent and warrant to Target that
Acquisition Sub is, and will be upon the purchase of the Top-Up Option
Shares, an "accredited investor," as defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D
under the Securities Act. Acquisition Sub agrees that the Top-Up Option
and the Top-Up Option Shares to be acquired upon exercise of the Top-
Up Option are being and will be acquired by Acquisition Sub for the
purpose of investment and not with a view to, or for resale in connection
with, any distribution thereof (within the meaning of the Securities Act).
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(d) No Effect on Appraisal Rights. Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained herein, to the fullest extent permitted by
applicable Law, each of the Parties agrees and acknowledges that in any
appraisal proceeding under Section 262 of the DGCL with respect to the
Dissenting Shares (as defined in Section 3.03(a)), the Surviving
Corporation (as defined in Section 2.01) shall not assert that the Top-Up
Option, the Top-Up Option Shares or any cash or the Promissory Note
delivered to Target in payment for such Top-Up Option Shares should be
considered in connection with the determination of the fair value of the
Dissenting Shares in accordance with Section 262 of the DGCL.
(e) Assignment of Top-Up Option. Without the prior written
consent of Target, the right to exercise the Top-Up Option granted
pursuant to this Agreement shall not be assigned by Acquisition Sub
other than to Parent or a direct or indirect wholly owned Subsidiary of
Parent, including by operation of Law or otherwise, and any attempted
assignment in violation of this Section 1.04(e) shall be null and void.
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